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In 1995 the Texas Legislature authorized the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) to 
improve child support services statewide through the creation of an Integrated Child Support 
System (ICSS) wherein the OAG may provide IV-D child support enforcement services under contract 
with counties that elect to participate in the system.  The OAG sought and was granted a waiver 
from the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) of the requirement for a written 
application for IV-D services in participating ICSS counties.  The waiver was renewed several times, 
but with the last approval the OAG was required to have the program independently evaluated.  The 
OAG contracted with the Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources (RMC) to design 
and conduct an evaluation to measure the impacts of ICSS, the results of which are included in this 
final report.   
The Ray Marshall Center conducted the ICSS waiver evaluation using a combination of 
random assignment and composite pre-post evaluation designs to measure the impacts of the 
waiver at the county level.  The evaluation relied primarily on OAG administrative records data, 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records, public assistance administrative records data, U.S. 
Bureau of the Census data, and other sources.  These were used for estimating net impacts and for 
identifying relevant factors that may influence or be associated with the observed impacts.  A 
process study provided a sufficient understanding of the structure and functioning of ICSS as 
implemented in order to accurately estimate the impacts of the waiver.  
The key research question for the impact analysis was: What effect did the ICSS waiver 
have on the collection and enforcement of child support in areas in which it was implemented? 
This was answered by focusing on more specific questions: 
1. What was the impact of introducing deemed, or “self-activating,” applications for IV-D 
services on child support monitoring, collections, and enforcement in Texas?   
2. How did the child support experience vary for those who “opted-out” of enforcement 
services in ICSS areas? 
3. How did the child support experience vary for those who “opted-in” to receive enforcement 
services prior to implementation of ICSS? 
4. Did the ICSS program differentially impact sub-populations, including Hispanics, or members 
of the military? 
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5. To what extent did ICSS change the composition and case characteristics of the IV-D 
caseload in participating counties?  
Random Assignment: El Paso County 
El Paso County was the only forward-looking experimental site in the Texas ICSS evaluation.  
Case randomization was done based on the last digit of the cause number with an optimal design 
assigning half of cases to the ICSS treatment group and half to the control group.  New cases in the 
ICSS experimental or treatment group were automatically registered to receive IV-D child support 
services, with an opportunity to opt-out.  New cases assigned to the control group did not receive 
IV-D services by default, but had the opportunity to apply on their own as they did prior to ICSS 
implementation.  Random assignment of new cases to the ICSS treatment and control groups began 
in El Paso in March of 2013 and was concluded on May 7th, 2014.   
At the conclusion of random assignment, 1175 cases had been identified for potential 
inclusion in the ICSS experiment in El Paso.  Of those who could be tracked within OAG 
administrative records data (95%), additional screens were applied for current receipt of public 
assistance, including TANF or Medicaid, and whether a child support case was already open.  A total 
of 743 cases, or just over 66% of cases passed both screens and were included in the experiment. Of 
these cases, 376 were randomly assigned to the ICSS treatment group, and 367 to the control group.  
T-tests comparing the treatment and control groups showed only one significant difference among 
36 tests.  Thus it was concluded that ICSS random assignment in El Paso produced essentially 
equivalent treatment and control groups. 
Quasi-Random Assignment:  Harris County 
In the Harris County family court system, there was for many years an ongoing “natural 
experiment” in which, depending on the court to which they were assigned, some individuals were 
automatically enrolled in ICSS, while others were required to actively apply if they wanted IV-D child 
support assistance.  During the roll-out period for Harris County, those utilizing the family law courts 
were assigned to one of nine courts, where the judges had chosen to implement the ICSS program in 
their courtrooms at different points in time (Sep 2004 to May 2012).  Assignment of cases to courts 
in Harris County satisfies the definition of random assignment because all cases in a given time 
frame have essentially equal odds of being assigned to an ICSS court. 
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In trying to determine whether ICSS had an impact on the composition of the caseload, an 
examination of characteristics of the treatment and comparison groups found a pattern of Harris 
County cases assigned under ICSS being slightly more affluent, with some mixed evidence as well.  
ICSS CPs and NCPs were more likely to be employed and showed greater historical employment and 
earnings, but were also more likely to rely on some benefits such as SNAP.   
Comparison Group Time Series Design: Other ICSS Counties 
ICSS was also implemented in seventeen other counties over 22 years, starting in 1997 with 
a demonstration in Bexar County (San Antonio).  We include pre- and post-ICSS cases from most of 
these counties in the evaluation as part of a comparison group time-series design, which also 
includes cases from similar non-ICSS counties.  The advantage of this final design is that impact 
estimates are longer-term and more representative of the state.  Whereas El Paso and Harris County 
have higher internal validity, results from the Other ICSS Counties time series design are more 
generalizable. 
Again, to determine whether ICSS impacted the composition of the caseload, we examined 
characteristics of ICSS treatment and comparison groups selected from 13 ICSS counties that 
converted within the time frame covered by the OAG data files.  Once again the general pattern 
emerged: members of new cases opened in ICSS counties tend to be slightly more affluent, on 
average, than those on new cases opened in these counties prior to ICSS, but again with some mixed 
evidence.  
Finally, non-ICSS comparison counties were selected using a quasi-experimental similarity 
estimation procedure.  Inclusion of these comparison counties allowed better control of one 
important factor: the passage of time.  This difference-in-differences design answers the question 
how much more things changed in the ICSS counties after ICSS implementation than they changed in 
the non-ICSS comparison counties. 
Results and Discussion  
The overall pattern of impacts among the El Paso, Harris, and Other ICSS counties sites is 
remarkably similar.  Child support collections were increased in all sites, sometimes dramatically.  
Combining registry only and full-service data to measure collections improved but did not 
completely eliminate the problem that some payments made outside the state disbursement unit 
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(contrary to policy) may be missed.  We can confidently conclude, at a minimum, that ICSS 
dramatically increased the documented payment of child support. 
Observed impacts of ICSS on public assistance and other benefit receipt was also remarkably 
consistent and positive.   Across sites, ICSS case members were less likely to receive SNAP, received 
less SNAP benefits, or both.  Receipt of TANF was similarly reduced in all sites in which it was 
measured, and receipt of Medicaid was consistently reduced across sites.  Moreover, these 
reductions cannot be solely attributed to shifts in the composition of the caseload, and they bolster 
confidence in the findings of consistent improvements in child support collections. 
Estimated impacts of ICSS on employment and earnings measures were strong and positive 
in Harris and Other ICSS Counties, while El Paso showed more mixed employment and earnings 
findings.  Most of the improvements in employment are likely due to the slight shift in the caseload 
toward those with more attachment to the labor market. 
The impact of ICSS on child support arrears was difficult to ascertain in any direct way.  With 
a biased measure that only detects arrears in the control group if they opt-in, findings on arrears 
balances are difficult to trust.  A money judgment measure was meant to capture this concept 
longer-term in a more unbiased way, but such judgments were simply too infrequent for any trend 
to be detected.  Finally, the alternative analysis of arrears made a convincing case that 
implementation of ICSS leads more cases to be opened nearer in time to the establishment of their 
child support orders, and in the long run on a statewide basis such cases have historically led to far 
lower arrears balances.  This strongly suggests that ICSS would be found to lead directly to reduced 
arrears, should the cases be followed long enough. 
The opt-in and opt-out analyses actually tell a similar story from opposite sides of the coin.  
The opt-in analysis looked at those who voluntarily sought full service enforcement of their child 
support cases prior to ICSS, whereas the opt-out analysis looked at those who voluntarily chose not 
to receive such services after ICSS.  Cases opting-in are more likely to have female NCPs, more likely 
to be older, more likely to be employed but at lower average wages.  In direct contrast, cases 
opting-out are more likely to have male NCPs, more likely to be younger, and less likely to be 
employed but at higher earnings.  This analysis paints a clear picture of those who think formal child 
support enforcement is good and useful versus those who do not.  
ICSS was found to have differential impacts for Hispanics and members of the military, but 
for the most part the program worked better for such groups.  In areas whose child support 
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caseloads contain more members of the military, ICSS led to better collection of child support, lesser 
arrears and money judgments, lesser reliance on public assistance, and better employment and 
earnings outcomes.  Areas with higher concentrations of Hispanics showed similar patterns on all of 
these, with the exception of child support, which was less likely to be collected but in higher 
amounts on average.  Apparent arrears accumulation was far less likely in higher Hispanic areas, so 
on the whole it is clear that ICSS implementation is not hurting these subgroups, and in many ways it 
appears to be helping. 
Considering all these results together, it is clear that members of the IV-D caseload under a 
system of deemed applications and default enrollment are slightly but not dramatically more 
affluent, but that the positive effects of ICSS also extend well beyond the impact of this shift.  
Making enrollment in IV-D services the default tends to bring in more cases, and in some ways these 
cases are slightly more affluent.  Some of these new cases subsequently opt-out, taking their 
chances that they will receive the support they need without the OAG.  What remains among the 
newly recruited cases is some fraction who weren’t sure whether they would benefit from IV-D 
enforcement or weren’t aware of its existence or value.  These could be the groups that benefit 
most from a shift in policy toward ‘deemed applications.’  They may not be poor now, but the 
assistance they receive enforcing child support obligations from the start could be the very thing 
that keeps them from becoming poor when the next economic shock hits. 
The effects of ICSS on the IV-D child support caseload are clear.  Better child support 
outcomes, strong evidence of reduced arrears, and reduced public assistance all testify to the 
importance of enforcing child support cases early.  The ‘nudge’ toward the IV-D system that ICSS 
represents appears to help these families in multiple ways, while the choice of opting-out preserves 




Integrated Child Support System (ICSS) 
In 1995 the Texas Legislature authorized the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) to 
improve child support services statewide through the creation of an Integrated Child Support 
System (ICSS) wherein the OAG may provide IV-D child support enforcement services under contract 
with counties that elect to participate in the system.  In support of the ICSS, the OAG requested that 
the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) at the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) grant Texas a waiver of the requirement for a written application for IV-D services in 
participating ICSS counties.  The rationale for the request was based on the earlier finding of the 
OAG Child Support Division that the application requirement was “a barrier to the collection of child 
support in participating counties.”1   OCSE granted Texas such waiver in March 1996 for a period of 
five years.  Due to the voluntary county-level choice to participate through the adoption of a local 
judicial rule, the counties participating in the ICSS system are sometimes also referred to as 'Local 
Rule' counties. 
The waiver was subsequently granted by OCSE for three consecutive five-year periods, the 
latest of which spanned the period from April 11, 2011 through April 11, 2016.  As a condition of the 
most recent waiver, the OAG was required to contract with an independent evaluator to conduct a 
rigorous impact analysis of the waiver.  The OAG and its Child Support Division (CSD) contracted 
with the Ray Marshall Center for the Study of Human Resources (RMC), a policy research and 
evaluation unit at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs of The University of Texas at Austin, 
to design and conduct an evaluation to measure the impacts of the ICSS created under the waiver 
policy.   
Impact Evaluation Design 
The Ray Marshall Center conducted the ICSS waiver evaluation using a combination of 
random assignment and composite pre-post evaluation designs to measure the impacts of the 
waiver at county-level operational scales in Texas.  The evaluation relied on multiple data sets, but 
primarily OAG administrative records data for determining child support case characteristics, child 
support obligations, collections, and enforcement actions.  OAG administrative data were 
                                                     
1 Integrated Child Support System Annual Progress Report: September 2009-August 2010, (nd), p.1. 
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supplemented with Unemployment Insurance (UI) quarterly wage and claim records, public 
assistance administrative records data, U.S. Bureau of the Census data, survey data from some 
customers2 who “opt-out” of IV-D services, and other data sources as appropriate and available.  
These were used for estimating net impacts and for identifying relevant factors that may influence 
or be associated with the observed impacts in ways that strengthen the explanatory power of the 
evaluation. 
The evaluation was supported by a process study designed to gain a sufficient 
understanding of the structure and functioning of the ICSS as implemented in order to accurately 
estimate the impacts of the waiver.  Impact estimates were derived by observing four categories of 
cases:  
1. “self-starting” cases in ICSS counties (and the El Paso treatment group);  
2. cases in ICSS counties (and in the El Paso treatment group) in which customers "opt-out" of 
services; 
3. application-based non-public assistance (NPA) cases in non-ICSS counties (and the El Paso 
control group); and 
4. Registry-only (RO) cases in non-ICSS counties (and the El Paso control group).  
The impact evaluation utilized multiple quantitative methods to arrive at estimates of the 
waiver's impact.  While any given method may to some degree be susceptible to alternative 
explanations, results distilled across several methods are more robust.   
Key Questions 
The RMC, in consultation with the staff of OAG-CSD and OCSE, developed key research 
questions for the impact analysis and understanding its results.  The impact analysis was primarily 
concerned with answering one over-arching research question: What effect did the ICSS waiver 
have on the collection and enforcement of child support in areas in which it was implemented? 
We answered this primary research question by focusing on more specific questions: 
                                                     
2 The OAG refers to its clients as "customers" in order to emphasize a service-oriented approach.  We follow 
that convention here. 
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1. What were the impacts of the introduction of a deemed, or “self-activating,” application for 
IV-D services under the OCSE waiver on child support monitoring, collections, and 
enforcement in Texas?   
2. How did the child support experience vary between those individuals whose application for 
IV-D services had been waived in participating counties and individuals who “opted-out” in 
those same counties? 
3. How did the child support experience vary between those individuals whose application for 
IV-D services had been waived in participating counties and non-recipients of public 
assistance who had applied for services in counties and courts not participating in the ICSS 
program or who had been assigned to a control group for evaluation purposes? 
4. Did the OCSE waiver differentially impact sub-populations within the IV-D caseload in terms 
of collections, payment stability, and other outcomes?  Did the impacts vary, particularly for 
cases involving Hispanics, or former and current military personnel, or other subgroups of 
interest? 
5. To what extent did the composition and case characteristics of the IV-D caseload change 
with the introduction of the waiver in participating counties?  Were the characteristics of 
the “self-activating” cases notably different from the regular application-based, non-public 
assistance IV-D caseload in the participating counties?  As a population universe, was the 
waiver population notably different from the statewide application-based, non-public 
assistance IV-D caseload? 
The five research questions above are listed verbatim as they were developed at the start of 
this project.  Although the frame for these questions has evolved since then, the spirit of each 
question is addressed in this final impact report, albeit in a different order.  For example, question 5 
is addressed first, in recognition of the finding that the first impact of ICSS implementation is a 
change in the composition of the OAG caseload.  Question 1, which is closely related to the over-
arching question, is answered for multiple sites throughout the Program Impact Estimates section.  
Question 2, regarding the experiences of those who opt-out of ICSS, was first answered in the 
interim impact report that was completed in July 2015, and is updated below in the Opt-out Analysis 
section with additional outcome measures and follow-up data.  Similarly, those who opted-in, or 
voluntarily applied for services prior to ICSS implementation in their areas, are the subjects of 
question 3, and are addressed in the Opt-in analysis section.  Finally, question 4, regarding varying 
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impacts among sub-populations, is addressed for Hispanics and members of the military in the 
Impact Variation by Subgroups section. 
Implementation of ICSS 
OAG IV-D and County Child Support Enforcement in Texas 
In 1985, the OAG became the operational entity for child support enforcement under Title 
IV-D of the Social Security Act in Texas, assuming the responsibility for the federally regulated and 
funded child support program.  District and county attorneys and the former Texas Department of 
Public Welfare had previously borne that responsibility since 1975 when federal legislation 
authorizing Title IV-D became effective.  Texas is one of only three states in which the attorney 
general is currently responsible for the child support program and one of a few states with a 
statewide consolidated program.  In most states, by comparison, child support programs are 
administered at the county governance level. 
The Child Support Division of the Office of the Attorney General is responsible for IV-D 
services, including: 
 Parent locator services 
 Establishment of paternity 
 Establishment of child support orders 
 Establishment of medical support orders 
 Review and adjustment of child support orders 
 Enforcement of child support and medical support orders 
 Collection and disbursement of child support payments 
Figure 1 illustrates the flow of new child support cases in counties that have not 
implemented ICSS, and it also accurately describes the flow as it existed in current ICSS counties 
prior to the implementation of ICSS.  Child support cases are automatically referred to the OAG if 
the custodial parent (CP) applies for or has received public assistance, including TANF or Medicaid.  
Approximately 45 percent of the current IV-D caseload are public assistance cases (known as IV-A 
cases), with only a small fraction of these being current public assistance, and the vast majority 
being former public assistance cases.  Individuals who require child support assistance may also 
apply for low-fee IV-D services.  These types of cases are also known as application-based or non-
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public assistance (NPA) cases.  As shown below, the ICSS waiver in relevant counties is primarily 
concerned with the treatment of these NPA cases. 
 




There is a major difference in the treatment of public assistance and non-public assistance 
child support cases.  A person who has never received public assistance can voluntarily terminate IV-
D services at any time.  Current public assistance recipients cannot terminate services and must 
cooperate with the OAG or risk losing their benefits.  Previous recipients of public assistance cannot 
terminate services until after any arrears assigned to the state have been recouped. 
Case Flow under ICSS 
The ICSS waiver in relevant counties allows all new child support orders—by “deeming” the 
application to have been made automatically—to be enforced by the OAG with status equal to other 
IV-D cases.  Figure 2 illustrates the flow of cases with child support orders in ICSS counties.  A close 
examination of this figure in comparison to Figure 1 reveals that the only major difference is in the 
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default action for non-public assistance cases.  Prior to ICSS, such cases are initiated as registry-only3 
(RO) cases by default, with the option of becoming full-service (FS) cases should they choose to 
apply.  Under ICSS, non-public assistance cases become full service by default, with the option of 
becoming registry-only cases at any time in a process known as 'opting-out'.  
The terms of the federal ICSS waiver require the OAG to inform custodial parents of their 
right to decline IV-D services.  Every custodial parent in a child support case deemed as a “self-
starting” IV-D case under the ICSS waiver is provided a letter that informs the custodial parent of his 
or her right and opportunity to decline IV-D services, in what is commonly referred to as the “opt-
out letter.”  Those who do not choose to opt-out become full service (FS) IV-D cases, but they retain 
the right to opt-out at a later date. 
Figure 2. OAG Case Flow in ICSS Counties 
 
  
                                                     
3 Registry Only (RO) is for payment processing only in privately entered child support orders.  OAG does not 
provide locate, enforcement, or collection services, nor do they track arrears (unpaid child support) for RO 
cases.  An RO case can become a IV-D full service case if either party applies for OAG services. 
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OCSE Waiver and Implementation of ICSS in Texas 
The OCSE waiver permits the OAG to automatically establish IV-D services and an ICSS office 
at the county level for those jurisdictions that choose to voluntarily participate in the ICSS program.  
Texas implemented ICSS on an incremental basis, expanding county by county as judges adopted a 
local rule deeming that new—and in some areas existing—child support orders rendered in their 
courts included an application for IV-D child support services.   Participating counties may also be 
known as “local rule counties”; self-starting cases are handled in “local rule offices.” Such offices 
consist, in some areas, of county Domestic Relations Offices (DROs) providing services under 
contract with OAG, while in one area (Bexar County) they consist of OAG field offices. Table 1 
presents ICSS or local rule adoption dates, case administration type, the respective Field Office 
numbers, and an indicator of whether new only or new and existing cases are subject to ICSS. 
Table 1. ICSS Implementation by Site 
County 
Name 





Bexar Mar 1997 OAG Field Office 214 New 
Cameron Aug 2005 OAG Field Office 313 New 
Dallas Oct 2005 Contract/DRO 418 New 
Ector May 2006 OAG Field Office 813 New 
Gregg Sep 2005 OAG Field Office 523 New 
Harris 
[varies]  
Sep 2004 to May 2012 
Contract/DRO 614/622 New and Existing 
Harrison May 2005 OAG Field Office 523 New 
Hidalgo Feb 2006 OAG Field Office 314 New 
Lubbock May 2009 OAG Field Office 107 New 
Midland Mar 2002 OAG Field Office 814 New 
Panola Sep 2005 OAG Field Office 523 New 
Smith Sep 2005 OAG Field Office 516 New 
Tarrant Oct 2000 Contract/DRO 909 New 
Taylor Nov 2005 Contract/DRO 106 New 
Travis Jul 2009 Contract/DRO 708 New 
Upshur Sep 2005 OAG Field Office 523 New 
Webb Oct 2006 OAG Field Office 312 New 
Wichita Dec 2003 OAG Field Office 109 New and Existing 
Source:  Texas OAG, Child Support Division 
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Subsequent to Bexar County's early experimentation with ICSS, mentioned briefly above and 
detailed below, Tarrant County followed as an early implementation site.  Tarrant County, consisting 
of the greater Fort Worth area, adopted a local rule and established an ICSS office in October 2000.  
Over time, sixteen additional counties established ICSS programs, culminating in the entry of Travis 
County (including the greater Austin area) in July 2009.  El Paso County, consisting of the greater El 
Paso area, was the most recent entrant into the ICSS system.  As part of this waiver evaluation, 
random assignment of new cases to either the ICSS treatment or control groups began in El Paso in 
March 2013 and ended in May 2014. 
The establishment of ICSS programs in participating counties has not been uniform across 
currently participating counties, although each must adopt a local rule or administrative order to 
allow voluntary participation in the system.  OAG and Bexar County, the first county to adopt a local 
rule in support of ICSS, initially executed a contract that allowed the Bexar County Child Support 
Enforcement Office to provide IV-D services on a pilot basis in its existing and new child support 
cases.  As originally structured, new cases were divided between the Bexar County Child Support 
Enforcement Office and an existing OAG Office in San Antonio.  After three years of pilot operation, 
in August 2000 the county office and its caseload were merged with the OAG Field Office, creating a 
unified Bexar County ICSS Office.4  
Wichita County, the main city of which is Wichita Falls, entered into ICSS in December 2003.  
It is one of only two counties to introduce an ICSS office that incorporated previously existing cases, 
as well as all new cases.  Child support enforcement for non IV-D cases had been handled by the 
county Friend of the Court (FOC) program, a part of the County’s Domestic Relations Office.  The 
County discontinued the Friend of the Court program due to budgetary constraints and all new and 
existing child support cases are administered under the waiver terms. 
Harris County, which encompasses the City of Houston, chose a unique, hybridized path of 
participation in ICSS.  Harris County approved a local rule that grants discretion to each of its nine 
family law courts to “opt-in” to the ICSS.   The courts incrementally adopted local rule beginning 
with three courts in September 2004, and concluding with the final court converting in May 2012 
(see Table 2).  This phased adoption, court-by-court, combined with an essentially random method 
                                                     
4 Although Bexar County no longer contracts with OAG to provide full enforcement services in IV-D cases, the 
local rule enables the ICSS office to continue providing monitoring and enforcement services for all new child 
support orders in Bexar County. 
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of assigning cases to courts, made Harris County an ideal site for studying the impact of ICSS when 
implemented as a natural experiment. 
The contract between OAG and Harris County authorized the creation of a County-operated 
ICSS office, jointly operated by the Harris County District Clerk and the Harris County Domestic 
Relations Office (DRO).  The DRO had been operating a Friend of the Court program for non-IV-D 
child support cases for many years.  As in Wichita County, the local rule deemed all existing Friend of 
the Court cases in participating courts as IV-D cases; all new Harris County child support orders in 
participating courts are monitored and enforced as IV-D cases from the rendition of the order.5   
Table 2. Harris County ICSS Entry Date by Court 











                                                     
5 Two separate office identifiers are used to differentiate the existing Friend of the Court caseload from the 




Random Assignment: El Paso County 
El Paso County was the only forward-looking experimental site in the Texas ICSS evaluation, 
and the only site in which assignment of cases to conditions was intentionally and unambiguously 
random6.  It was very important for researchers to monitor the random assignment process and 
outcomes to ensure that it resulted in two groups of cases and case members who were essentially 
equivalent at the point of random assignment.  These criteria having been satisfied, any differences 
between the groups that emerged later could be safely attributed as an impact of the Integrated 
Child Support System. 
Random Assignment Mechanism 
Random assignment in El Paso County proceeded as designed.  New cases in the ICSS 
experimental or treatment group were automatically registered to receive IV-D child support 
services, with an opportunity to opt-out.  New cases assigned to the control group did not receive 
IV-D services by default, but had the opportunity to apply on their own as they did prior to ICSS 
implementation.   
The intended case flow for experimental and control group cases in El Paso County during 
enrollment is illustrated in Figure 3.7  Cases randomly assigned to the control group (non-ICSS) were 
meant to follow the left path in this chart, while those assigned to the experimental group (ICSS) 
followed the right path.  Control cases following the left path began in registry-only (RO) status by 
default, unless they chose to opt-in and apply for IV-D services.  Experimental, or ICSS cases, 
followed the right path and became full service (FS) cases until and unless they chose to opt-out.  
Cases whose members were currently receiving public assistance (PA) at entry were ineligible for 
inclusion in the impact study, and are represented in Figure 3 by a red arrow bypassing random 
assignment and leading directly to FS case status. 
Case randomization in El Paso County, as illustrated by the random wheel in the figure, was 
done using a fixed but arbitrary characteristic, the last digit of the cause number, to minimize the 
                                                     
6 Implementation of ICSS in Harris County was done in such a way that enrollment in ICSS for new cases was 
essentially random during the court-by-court rollout period. 
7 This figure was adapted from Figure 3 in Integrated Child Support System: Evaluation Analysis Plan, 
Schroeder, O’Shea, & Gupta, 2012. 
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possibility of the system being gamed.  This optimal design assigned half of the cases to the ICSS 
treatment group and half to the control group, based on whether the last digit of the cause number 
was odd or even. 
Figure 3. OAG Case Flow in El Paso County, Random Assignment by Cause Number  
 
Random Assignment, Implementation 
Implementation of ICSS in El Paso, including random assignment of new cases to the ICSS 
treatment and control groups, began in March of 2013 and was concluded on May 7th, 2014.  All 
new cases opened in El Paso subsequent to that date have been enrolled in ICSS, and are not 
included in the impact evaluation.  A total of 1,175 cases were assigned by the EPDRO, however, 
Cause number assigned by random wheel 
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(Control) 
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substantial shares of these identified cases were found to have characteristics that precluded their 
inclusion in the experiment.  Reasons for the exclusion of cases are detailed below.  Outcomes for 
the remaining cases are included in the impact analysis below. 
Random Assignment, Exclusions 
At the conclusion of the random assignment period, a cumulative total of 1,175 cases had 
been identified for potential inclusion in the ICSS experiment in El Paso County.  Of these, 
researchers were able to locate 1,119 cases (or 95%) within OAG administrative records data.  These 
1,119 identified cases were subjected to additional screens using administrative records data to 
determine, as of the date of random assignment, 1) whether any members of the custodial parent 
(CP) family were receiving public assistance, including TANF or Medicaid, or 2) whether a child 
support case was already open.   
Table 3. El Paso Case Eligibility for Random Assignment 
Child support case status 
at random assignment 
Public Assistance (PA) status at random assignment 
No PA Children Only CP Only Both 
Case not yet open 
743 26 9 113 
66.4% 2.3% 0.8% 10.1% 
Case already Open 
168 6 3 51 
15.0% 0.5% 0.3% 4.6% 
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data. 
As shown in Table 3, a total of 743 cases, or just over 66% of cases passed both screens and 
were included in the experiment.  Of the remainder, 168 cases, or 15% were excluded for already 
having a child support case open; 148 cases, or 13.2% were excluded for ongoing receipt of public 
assistance; and another 60 cases, or 5.3% were excluded for both reasons. 
True experiments, which involve random assignment of cases to treatment and control 
groups, represent the gold standard for determining causality, or whether the treatment can be said 
to have caused any differences that emerge later.  When properly done, true experiments are said 
to be high in internal validity to the extent that the only differences between the groups as of 
random assignment are due to chance alone.  If one were to remove cases from one or the other 
group based on events occurring subsequent to random assignment, this would threaten the 
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internal validity and make it difficult to safely conclude that the experiment caused the effects 
observed.   
On the other hand, removing cases based on objective criteria, uniformly applied, prior to 
random assignment, has no effect on internal validity.  Instead, this practice affects the external 
validity of the findings, or in other words, it constrains the populations to which the effects can be 
expected to generalize.  Among cases identified for potential inclusion in the El Paso ICSS 
experiment, those who are receiving public assistance cannot be randomly assigned because 
according to policy they should be referred to the OAG as full-service cases.  Since they cannot 
receive the control group experience, they must be excluded from both groups in the experiment to 
preserve the pre-program comparability of the two groups.  Similarly, cases identified for potential 
inclusion that are discovered to already have a child support case open also cannot receive the true 
control group experience, and thus must be excluded entirely from the study as well.  The net effect 
of these exclusions is that external validity is narrowed somewhat, and the estimated impacts of 
ICSS can only be generalized to the population of new child support cases that are not receiving 
public assistance.  On the other hand, with high internal validity preserved, one can draw strong 
conclusions that the ICSS program caused the observed impacts. 
Results of Random Assignment 
Of the 743 cases determined to be eligible for inclusion in the experiment, 376 were 
randomly assigned to the ICSS treatment group, and 367 to the control group.  Random assignment 
was based on a pre-determined but essentially random characteristic: whether the last digit of the 
cause number was odd or even.8  As a final check on the fairness of the random assignment 
mechanism, it is useful to compare characteristics of members of the final ICSS treatment and 
control groups (see Table 4).  Note, however, that it was not possible to determine whether the two 
groups had equal proportions of current military members due to inadequacy of this measure for 
members of the control group. 
                                                     
8 Cause numbers are assigned sequentially upon their creation.  Thus the last digit is a random wheel, and thus 
whether it is odd or even is essentially a random process. 
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All cases, demographics N=376 N=367  
NCP age (years) 37.0 36.9  
NCP is female 6.2% 6.5%  
NCP is Hispanic 19.9% 23.7%  
NCP is black 3.2% 2.5%  
NCP race/ethnicity unknown 69.9% 62.1% * 
NCP is current or former military 28.2%   
CP age (years) 35.1 35.1  
CP is Hispanic 21.8% 25.9%  
CP is black 1.6% 1.6%  
CP race/ethnicity unknown 68.6% 63.2%  
CP is current or former military 2.4%   
Number of children 1.6 1.6  
Age of youngest child, years 7.2 7.2  
Age of oldest child, years 9.1 9.0  
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history    
NCP employed at case opening 40.4% 40.6%  
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters 41.4% 38.4%  
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $6,170 $5,603  
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters 16.0% 12.0%  
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters) 22.2 20.5  
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 41.2% 39.0%  
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year 4.3% 2.7%  
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 2.4% 2.7%  
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year 3.2% 3.0%  
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.3% 0.3%  
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.1% 0.3%  
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 1.2% 0.9%  
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history    
CP employed at case opening 53.2% 52.3%  
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters 48.1% 48.3%  
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $4,952 $5,381  
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters 14.6% 12.5%  
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters) 22.1 22.1  









CP filed for unemployment within prior year 2.9% 2.5%  
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 11.2% 10.1%  
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year 8.7% 10.3%  
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.0% 0.0%  
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.0% 0.0%  
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 0.9% 1.5%  
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG, TWC, and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data. 
T-tests revealed only one significant difference (p<.05) between El Paso ICSS treatment and 
control groups among the characteristics listed in Table 2: NCP race/ethnicity unknown.  When 
conducting statistical tests at this level of sensitivity (alpha=.05), one can expect to find 
approximately one significant difference due to chance alone for every twenty tests conducted.  
Thus, with only one significant difference observed among 36 tests conducted, it is safe to conclude 
based on this evidence that ICSS random assignment in El Paso has produced essentially equivalent 
treatment and control groups.  
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Quasi-Random Assignment:  Harris County 
In the Harris County family court system, there was for many years an ongoing “natural 
experiment” in which, depending on the court to which they were assigned, some individuals were 
automatically enrolled in the ICSS program under the local rule, while others needed to actively 
apply if they wanted IV-D child support assistance.  During the implementation period for Harris 
County (Sep 2004 to May 2012, see Table 2 above and Figure 4 below), customers utilizing the Harris 
County family law courts were randomly assigned to one of nine courts, where the judges had 
chosen to implement the ICSS program in their courtrooms at different points in time.   
Figure 4 illustrates the approximate share of the caseload that was assigned to ICSS over 
time due to the phased entry of the nine Harris County courts into the ICSS system.  Beginning in 
September 2004, three out of every nine cases were assigned to ICSS.  By February 2006, six out of 
every nine cases were assigned to ICSS, and by May 2012 when the 247th District Court converted, 
all cases were assigned to ICSS.  





As an example, Figure 5 illustrates the case flow in Harris County as of September 2004, a 
period of time in which one third of all cases were assigned to ICSS.  The flow is similar to that 
shown in Figure 3 for El Paso County, except that the randomization for Harris County cases is done 
through the court number to which one’s case is assigned.  The diagram would look the same at 
other points in time except that the share of cases assigned to ICSS would vary with the number of 
courts converted by that date. 
Figure 5. OAG Case Flow in Harris County, Random Assignment by Court Number, 
Example from Sep 2004 
 
 
Assignment of cases to courts in Harris County is based on a random wheel.  That is, cases 
are queued, and the first is assigned to the first court, the second to the second, and so on until nine 
cases have been assigned, at which point the process repeats from the first court until the cases are 
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all assigned.  As with odd and even case numbers in El Paso, this process satisfies the definition of 
random assignment because all cases in a given time frame have essentially equal odds of being 
assigned to an ICSS court. 
Noting that implementation of ICSS should have produced a shift in the composition of the 
caseload9, we examined characteristics of the Harris County treatment and comparison groups, and 
the results are shown in Table 5.   Note that in this table the screen to eliminate cases receiving 
Public Assistance at case opening have already been applied, and we have restricted the cases in the 
study to new cases opening during a one year period before and after implementation of ICSS.  This 
strategy is discussed in greater detail in the next section as well as in Appendix A.  
The numbers in Table 5 show a clear pattern of Harris County cases assigned under ICSS 
being slightly more affluent, relative to the pre-ICSS comparison group.  Of course, the presence of 
statistically significant differences here is in large part due to the much larger sample sizes in Harris 
County.  With such high levels of statistical ‘power,’ many of the smaller differences, although 
judged to be statistically significant, may be of little practical significance.  However, the pattern of 
differences among employment and benefit indicators, for both NCPs and CPs, does suggest a trend 
of practical significance.  Both CPs and NCPs in the ICSS group were more likely to be employed at 
case opening, for example, and showed greater historical employment and earnings, were less likely 
to have filed for unemployment compensation recently, and were less likely to rely on benefits such 
as Medicaid. 
Importantly, the differences observed here not only suggest that ICSS had an impact on the 
composition of the caseload, but that this needs to be taken into account when conducting the 
analysis of program impacts.  Whereas it is common to include indicators such as those in Table 5 as 
covariates in statistical models, for the purpose of improving the estimation of program impacts by 
controlling for personal characteristics, doing so in this case would cause the underestimation of the 
effects of the ICSS program.  Going forward, all estimates of ICSS impacts are done with no 
covariates included in the statistical models.
                                                     
9 Prior to recognition that ICSS could lead to compositional changes in the caseload, some effort was expended 
in earlier reports attempting to demonstrate the groups’ equivalence at the point of random assignment.   
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group   
All cases, demographics N=9,814 N=9,532   
NCP age (years) 34.6 34.5   
NCP is female 11.6% 11.2%   
NCP is Hispanic 26.1% 24.8% * 
NCP is black 29.0% 30.5% * 
NCP race/ethnicity unknown 23.0% 22.9%   
NCP is current or former military 3.1%     
CP age (years) 33.3 33.0   
CP is Hispanic 26.0% 24.3% ** 
CP is black 25.2% 26.3%   
CP race/ethnicity unknown 27.4% 28.0%   
CP is current or former military 0.5%     
Number of children 1.43 1.39 ** 
Age of youngest child, years 6.1 6.3 ** 
Age of oldest child, years 7.3 7.6 ** 
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history       
NCP employed at case opening 61.2% 58.4% ** 
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters 59.3% 57.9% * 
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $7,687 $6,857 ** 
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 23.7% 27.2% ** 
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters) 28.7 28.6   
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 58.9% 56.5% ** 
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year 6.7% 9.1% ** 
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 4.3% 3.9%   
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year 5.0% 4.2% ** 
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.2% 0.1%   
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.2% 0.2%   
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 3.0% 3.6% * 
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history       
CP employed at case opening 64.9% 60.7% ** 
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters 61.1% 58.1% ** 








group   
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 20.4% 21.4%   
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters) 27.5 26.7 ** 
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 61.3% 57.5% ** 
CP filed for unemployment within prior year 5.6% 6.7% ** 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 14.2% 12.8% ** 
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year 14.3% 12.1% ** 
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.0% 0.0%   
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.8% 1.7% ** 
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 8.7% 10.5% ** 





Time Series Design: Other ICSS Counties 
Aside from Harris and El Paso Counties, ICSS was also implemented in seventeen other 
counties over 22 years (see Table 1, earlier), starting with a demonstration in Bexar County, which 
includes the city of San Antonio, in 1997-2001.  Cases are included from most of these counties in 
the evaluation, subject to data availability, as part of a comparison group time-series design from 
time periods before and after they became ICSS counties; this design also includes cases from 
similar non-ICSS counties.  The advantage of this final design is that by including residents of as 
many areas of the state as possible, the resulting impact estimates will be more representative of 
the state as a whole.  This serves as a nice counterweight to the experimental and quasi-
experimental designs used for El Paso and Harris County, respectively.  While those designs have 
higher internal validity but relatively lower generalizability, this time series design should produce 
results that are more representative of the state, thus making the results more generalizable. 
Table 6 shows characteristics of ICSS treatment and comparison groups selected from those 
other ICSS counties that converted within the window of time covered by our OAG administrative 
data files.  As noted in Appendix A, some counties that converted earlier had to be excluded.  Similar 
to the patterns seen in Harris County, again many statistically significant differences between the 
ICSS Treatment and Comparison groups are noted.  This does not present a problem for the 
estimation of program impacts, since ICSS implementation is expected to change the composition of 
the caseload.  Again, with high statistical power, many of the statistically ‘significant’ differences 
noted are small in practical terms.  Once again the same general pattern emerges: members of new 
cases opened in ICSS counties tend to be slightly more affluent, on average, than those members of 











group   
All cases, demographics N=16,964 N=19,020   
NCP age (years) 34.3 33.4 ** 
NCP is female 13.2% 12.4% * 
NCP is Hispanic 35.1% 34.3%   
NCP is black 22.1% 24.0% ** 
NCP race/ethnicity unknown 15.9% 19.5% ** 
NCP is current or former military 3.7%     
CP age (years) 33.4 32.2 ** 
CP is Hispanic 34.2% 33.8%   
CP is black 18.7% 20.7% ** 
CP race/ethnicity unknown 20.0% 23.2% ** 
CP is current or former military 0.7%     
Number of children 1.45 1.39 ** 
Age of youngest child, years 6.4 6.2 ** 
Age of oldest child, years 7.7 7.5 ** 
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history       
NCP employed at case opening 59.4% 55.9% ** 
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters 57.9% 55.4% ** 
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $6,301 $5,491 ** 
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 26.2% 27.4% * 
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters) 28.9 28.4 ** 
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 57.1% 53.9% ** 
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year 6.2% 6.7%   
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 5.3% 7.3% ** 
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year 7.0% 7.4%   
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.1% 0.1%   
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.2% 0.3% ** 
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 4.9% 4.1% ** 
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history       
CP employed at case opening 62.9% 60.0% ** 








group   
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $4,947 $4,327 ** 
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 19.9% 21.8% ** 
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters) 27.2 26.6 ** 
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 59.9% 57.0% ** 
CP filed for unemployment within prior year 4.9% 5.8% ** 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 13.1% 19.8% ** 
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year 15.0% 18.3% ** 
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.0% 0.1%   
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.9% 1.4% ** 
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 12.6% 8.9% ** 
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG, TWC, and HHSC administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Finally, multiple non-ICSS comparison counties were selected for each of these Other ICSS 
counties using a quasi-experimental similarity estimation procedure, which is described more fully in 
Appendix A.  The purpose of selecting these comparison counties was to allow better control of the 
one factor that the 'Other ICSS counties’ design does not adequately control for: the passage of 
time, over which progress in the quality case enforcement is often seen.  Among the Other ICSS 
counties, using a pre/post design to accumulate study cases, each county serves as its own 
comparison group, so this research design does a good job of controlling for potential differences 
associated with geography and local labor markets.  Each county contributes a year’s worth of new 
cases to the ICSS comparison group, and a year’s worth of new cases to the ICSS treatment group, 
but starting two years later than the first new cases in the comparison group.  This time differential 
could potentially lead us to attribute differences to ICSS that might in fact be due simply to the 
improvements associated with passage of time in these counties.  However, with the inclusion of 
additional comparison counties that did not operate ICSS programs at the time, we can eliminate 
the possibility that time alone caused the differences observed by checking for such differences in 
these other counties.  In effect, with this difference-in-differences design, the estimation of ICSS 
impacts in the Other ICSS counties becomes a question of how much more things changed in these 
ICSS counties after ICSS implementation than they changed in the non-ICSS comparison counties 




Subgroup Analysis Strategy 
One goal of the ICSS evaluation was to determine whether ICSS differentially impacted 
subgroups of interest, including specifically those of Hispanic ethnicity or members of the military.  
This should have been a straightforward analysis, however, problems with the data quality of the 
military and Hispanic indicators necessitated developing alternative methods of answering these 
questions. 
The military indicator measure was based not on a direct reporting of military status, but on 
whether the employer records of NCPs in the OAG data system indicated they were employed by a 
branch of the military.  Since the OAG data system is far more likely to contain employer records for 
members of full service (FS) cases, as opposed to registry only (RO) cases, and since the bulk of 
control group cases are RO, at least initially, this measure was judged to be inadequate for 
unambiguously identifying current military members within the control group.  Similarly, there are 
unacceptably high levels of race/ethnicity unknown within both groups, as well as some indication 
that the completion percentage varies with RO status, and this casts doubt on the adequacy of the 
Hispanic ethnicity indicator as well. 
A solution to this problem was to conduct the subgroup analysis at the county level, rather 
than at the individual level.  Within the group of seventeen “other ICSS counties,” that includes all 
ICSS sites except Harris and El Paso, there were thirteen counties in the pre-post time series 
comparison group design that was used to estimate impacts of ICSS.  These thirteen counties 
showed substantial natural variation in the shares of their FS child support caseloads who were 
Hispanic, and decent but not great variation in the shares of their caseloads who were military 
members.  Table 7 shows the scheme for dividing these counties into groups of those with low and 
high percentages of Hispanic CPs and NCPs. 
By dividing the other ICSS counties into groups, it was possible to test whether the impacts 
of ICSS varied according to the concentration of Hispanic CPs and NCPs.  This was not a very 
sensitive test, thus the differential impact of ICSS due to Hispanic ethnicity would likely need to be 
sizable for this test to detect it.  This does seem to be the best method of detecting such differential 
impacts, given the constraints of the available data. 
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Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records. 
Table 8 shows a similar scheme for categorizing the other ICSS counties into low and high 
shares of active military members in their FS caseloads.  Note that, in contrast to the Hispanic 
scheme discussed above, this military categorization scheme included El Paso County among the 
other ICSS counties.  Since El Paso had by far the largest concentration of active military members 
among ICSS child support caseloads, the decision was made to include it in this analysis.10   As noted 
before, the differential effects of ICSS on these subgroups would have to be large in order to be 
detected by this test.  In this case it may be even more difficult to detect a military influence, given 
that even in the high military counties, military members make up less than 8% of the child support 
caseload.  In the absence of a better method, this was judged to be the best approach for answering 
the question of whether ICSS impacts varied for these groups. 
  
                                                     
10 Although El Paso ICSS impacts are regarded as experimental and the other ICSS counties as non-
experimental, combining results in this way should not affect the validity of this subgroup analysis. 
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PROGRAM IMPACT ESTIMATES 
Throughout this paper reference has been made to an approach to impact analysis that 
follows all cases that are part of the study regardless of what happens with their case status.  In 
estimating the impact of the ‘nudge’ toward participation in the IV-D program that ICSS represents, 
one must allow that impacts may include initial registry-only (RO) cases opting-in to full service (FS), 
and initial FS cases opting-out and becoming RO cases.  Impacts could also include case members 
changing their minds about it later and reversing these decisions.  While acknowledging these 
impacts allows one to describe this program as it is implemented in the real world, one can also 
examine the extent to which such opt-in or opt-out decisions are made over time.  Estimating what 
fraction of the groups are receiving different treatments over the course of their case histories 
provides a frame for interpreting the impacts estimated for the different sites. 
Figure 6 shows the share of cases in full service status by months since their cases opened, 
in effect showing the average case history, for the treatment (or experimental) and comparison (or 
control) groups at each site.  El Paso, whose trends are illustrated by the short green-hued lines at 
the top and bottom of the chart, shows the expected pattern for a policy implemented as a tightly 
controlled experiment.  Almost a quarter (24.2%) of control group cases open a full-service case 
within the first month, and this number drifts up by a couple more percentage points two years 
later, to 26.3% full service.  Of those randomly assigned to ICSS, a healthy 93.1% had opened full 
service cases in the first month, while 89.4% of cases were full service two years later.  Put 
differently, this means random assignment in El Paso led to a 283% increase in FS case status, which 
persisted as a 247% increase two years into their case histories. 
By comparison, the natural implementation of ICSS in the Harris and Other County sites led 
to a much milder shift toward full-service status among non-public assistance cases.  Far more 
comparison group (pre-ICSS) cases made it into FS status in these sites, and fewer cases were in FS 
status after the conversion to ICSS, as compared to the stronger shift in El Paso.  The net effect was 
a 32% increase in FS status in Harris County, which persisted as a 26% increase two years later.  
Similarly, the Other ICSS counties in aggregate saw a 27% increase in FS status due to ICSS 
implementation, which persisted as a 25% increase two years later.  These can be viewed as better 
estimates what an ICSS rollout looks like in the real world.  They also suggest the possibility that 




Figure 6. Experimental Drift: Full-Service Case Share over Time 
 
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.   
 
El Paso: Experimental Impacts 
The use of a random assignment or experimental design, with assignment to groups 
proceeding as planned, means that impact estimates for the El Paso site are considered to be causal 
in nature.  Thus we can conclude that any impacts observed were caused by the ICSS program 
implementation in El Paso.   
Below we estimate the impacts of ICSS implementation overall.  We also conducted 
additional analysis to address the possibility that a learning curve among El Paso ICSS child support 
enforcement workers in using the many enforcement tools newly available to them might affect 
their performance early on.  In order to test for this, we split the El Paso sample in half by 
assignment date.  Should we find greater impacts among those randomly assigned toward the end 
of the assignment window, this could be taken as evidence that workers improved over time in their 
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use of the new collection tools.  Such impacts would thus be regarded as representative of the 
impacts one could expect from a more mature, fully-functioning ICSS program. 
Collection of Child Support 
The most important impact that ICSS might have is the timely collection of child support.  
Although we have had questions about the adequacy of administrative data for measuring child 
support collection equally well for members of cases in the control group, we have acquired 
registry-only (RO) payments data and incorporated it into our dependent measures, so our ability to 
measure child support collected is vastly improved.  Still, some payments may be missed while cases 
are in RO status.  Although RO cases are required to make payments through the state disbursement 
unit (SDU), there is no enforcement of these cases by the Title IV-D agency as long as they remain in 
RO status.  While they are not being enforced, some share of these cases may involve payments 
made directly to the CP, and these payments will not be recorded in the SDU11.  In any case, though 
we may not have completely solved the problem of equal measurement of child support paid while 
in RO status, we have improved it to the point that we can compute outcomes with the caveat that 
this measure is still imperfect.  
Several measures presented here address child support collection, with one approach 
gauging the frequency of any child support collections and another examining the average dollar 
amount of collections.  The frequency of any collections being made is reported separately for full 
service (FS) and registry-only (RO) collections so their independent contributions to program 
impacts can be seen.  All child support collections measures are computed on a monthly basis, 
aggregating payments made within a calendar month.  As shown in the third row of Table 9, child 
support was collected in 64% of case months among ICSS cases, an impressive rate, as compared to 
a 51% collection rate in the control group.  The bulk of these payments was made through the 
expected channels, FS for ICSS cases, and RO (or collections through the SDU) for the control group.  
Note however that payments made through the other, non-expected route can occur due to cases 
changing status, from FS to RO, and vice versa, over time.  In a true experimental design these 
changes are part of the impact; people can opt freely from one group to the other, but we continue 
to track their outcomes in terms of their original group assignment to assess true ICSS impacts. 
                                                     
11 There is no known direct quantitative evidence that payments are made outside the SDU by RO cases, but 
there is anecdotal support for this idea. 
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mean ICSS Impact 
Any FS child support collections made 62.7% 11.9% 50.8% ** 
Any RO child support collections made 1.2% 39.6% -38.4% ** 
Any child support collections made, either type 63.8% 51.4% 12.4% ** 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $927 $949 -$22   
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
The total dollar amount of child support collections per case in El Paso, when looking only at 
cases that made a payment in a given month, averaged $927, and was not statistically different from 
the control group.12  Similar results were found on these measures when we looked at ICSS impacts 
among those assigned in the second half of the study (see detailed statistical tests for late 
assignments in Appendix B, Table B-5).  The impact on any child support collections, at 17.9%, was 
indeed stronger in the second half of the study, suggesting limited confirmation of the learning 
curve theory, but this bigger impact was paired with a $91 lesser monthly payment, on average, 
among those making payments on these late cases.   
A severe missing-data problem plagues the analysis of child support arrears, presented in 
Table 10.  Since we can only detect arrears balances accumulated for full-service cases, there is a 
built-in bias in this measure against ICSS cases, who are overrepresented among FS cases due to 
successful implementation of ICSS, as shown earlier in Figure 6.  Thus it is not surprising that there 
appear to be large impacts on the share of cases with arrears due.  While we can’t know what the 
real impact on arrears due is, because we can’t know whether RO cases are behind on payments, it 
is useful to report this statistic in case the true ICSS effect ever grows large enough to overcome this 
built-in bias.  It is worth noting that the average follow-up duration of the arrears measures 
reported for El Paso is a mere 11 months after case opening, so these are short duration impacts.13 
  
                                                     
12 More detailed statistics supporting impact estimates listed here are included in Appendix B. 












mean ICSS Impact 
Money judgment made in child support case 0.2% 0.2% 0.0%   
Any arrears owed 43.6% 9.8% 33.8% ** 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $3533 $5025 -$1492   
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
In one final indicator related to child support collections, we measured cumulative money 
judgments, case actions typically filed in court in instances of extended non-payment.  A cumulative 
money judgment is an estimate of what is currently owed by the NCP, considering the most recent 
prior cumulative money judgment (if any), plus new current support and interest accrued, minus 
amounts paid by the NCP.  Because they are filed through the courts, we can measure money 
judgments about equally well for both ICSS and control group cases14, so it is possible to estimate 
program impacts on this measure.  Results for this measure indicate no impact of ICSS, however, as 
noted above, the average follow-up duration in El Paso is short.  
Receipt of Public Assistance by Custodial Parents 
The next set of analyses addresses the question whether ICSS led to changes in Public 
Assistance participation for the associated custodial parents (CPs) and their children.  Public 
assistance receipt is summarized in Table 11.  We intended to ask whether ICSS led to changes in 
utilization of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families benefits, or the TANF program.  
Unfortunately, we observed too few instances of TANF receipt in El Paso to model it statistically. 
We asked whether ICSS led to reduced participation in SNAP, or Supplemental Nutritional 
Assistance Program, formerly known as Food Stamps.  This measure counts the percent of post-
entry months in which the custodial parent received SNAP benefits, with receipt of benefits for any 
part of the month considered as receipt for the entire month.  ICSS in El Paso was found to lead to 
                                                     
14 Cumulative money judgments filed on full service (FS) cases are more likely to include interest calculations 
than those filed on registry only (RO) cases.  However, by comparing the number of instances of money 
judgments, rather than the amounts of money involved, we avoid artificial bias in this measure. 
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reduced participation in SNAP.  ICSS participants had less than a percentage point decrease in SNAP 
participation, representing about a 10% decrease, compared to cases in the control group. 







mean ICSS Impact 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 7.6% 8.4% -0.8%  * 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP $257 $300 -$43 ** 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 3.4% 4.8% -1.4% ** 
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.  *=p<.05; 
**=p<.01. 
A related SNAP measure looks at the average monthly dollar amount of benefits received 
under SNAP, and considering only case-months in which the benefit was received (that is, no zeroes 
were included in the average).  The average monthly SNAP benefit was $257 for those in the ICSS, or 
$43 lower than control group members who received SNAP.  Finally, we measured the percentage of 
time that the CP was enrolled in Medicaid.  Again, as with SNAP receipt, we found a significant effect 
of ICSS, with receipt among ICSS case members being 1.4 percentage points lower than members of 
the control group. 
Taken together, the findings in this section suggest that families who were automatically 
enrolled in child support enforcement via the ICSS program experienced slightly lesser economic 
distress in comparison to control group members.  Furthermore, all the benefit receipt effects seen 
in El Paso were stronger when we looked only at those assigned in the second half of the study (see 
Appendix B, Table B-5). 
Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs 
The next set of analyses examines the question whether ICSS child support enforcement 
leads to increased employment rates and earnings levels among custodial and noncustodial parents.  
Unlike with the public assistance programs discussed above, it would be difficult to make a strong 
argument that better and timelier child support enforcement should lead to better employment and 
earnings outcomes.  In any case, looking for program impacts on these measures allows us to place 
the other observed impacts in the overall context of the families’ economic situations.  Two 
measures are included here, one that gauges the percent of time CPs and NCPs were employed, and 
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another that measures the quarterly earnings levels of those who were employed in any given 
calendar quarter.   
As shown in Table 12, the ICSS program effects on earnings and employment of NCPs and 
CPs was a mixed bag.  We observed significantly lesser earnings among CPs in ICSS, but significantly 
greater employment rates among NCPs, as well as greater earnings of those who are employed, 
among NCPs in ICSS.  While this pattern is difficult to explain, if we look again at impacts among 
those assigned late in the period (Appendix B, Table B-5), we see that none of the ICSS employment 
or earnings findings hold, as all are statistically non-significant. 







mean ICSS Impact 
CP employed 51.9% 49.8% 2.1%   
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $9393 $10874 -$1481 ** 
NCP employed 41.6% 39.1% 2.5%  * 
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed $16606 $13654 $2952 ** 





Harris County:  Quasi-Experimental Impacts 
As noted earlier in the discussion of experimental designs, we no longer attempt to control 
for any of the mostly small differences between the ICSS and comparison groups in Harris County.  
We neither attempt to match cases to produce a comparison group, nor do we include covariates in 
the impact analysis that would control for these initial differences.  Instead, we treat these 
differences as occurring due to the implementation of ICSS and report them along with any other 
outcome differences observed. 
We have, however, substantially improved the Harris County data model over the course of 
this evaluation.  For example, because Harris County is one of the sites that converts existing cases 
when ICSS is rolled out (most sites only create new cases under ICSS), we now restrict our use of 
follow-up data to one year after case opening so that outcomes only reflect the period prior to when 
comparison cases became eligible to convert to ICSS.  Because of these improvements, we can be 
more confident that the effects reported for Harris County were due to ICSS implementation.  On 
the other hand, any findings from the Harris County site are now essentially short-term impacts. 
Collection of Child Support 
For members of the ICSS group in Harris County, as shown in Table 13, child support was 
collected over 14 percentage points more often, relative to comparison group cases.  Furthermore, 
the total dollar amount of child support collections in Harris County, averaging across only those 
cases that received a payment in a given month, was $661, representing an increase of $62 per 
month more than that received by comparison group cases. 











Any FS child support collections made 45.9% 29.1% 16.8% ** 
Any RO child support collections made 4.7% 7.0% -2.3% ** 
Any child support collections made, either type 50.4% 35.9% 14.5% ** 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $661 $599 $62 ** 
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Finally, we examine several measures designed to indicate the extent to which cases may be 
delinquent in making child support payments.  As discussed earlier, we should be able to measure 
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money judgments equally well for both ICSS and control group cases.  Interestingly, as shown in 
Table 14, ICSS was found to have no impact on money judgments, perhaps reflecting the short 
duration of the follow-up for Harris County cases.  Arrears balances, as discussed with respect to the 
El Paso findings above, cannot be measured equally well for comparison group cases, who are more 
likely to be in RO status than treatment or ICSS cases, and hence their arrears balances would be 
unknown.  Thus it is not surprising that ICSS cases were more likely to have arrears balances when 
using this flawed measure.  Interestingly, among cases who have known arrears balances, NCPs on 
ICSS cases owed $996 less than their comparison group counterparts.  For context, it should be 
noted that these arrears balances were measured on average 7 months after cases opened, so again 
they should be considered short-term impacts.15 











Money judgment made in child support case 0.3% 0.3% 0.0%   
Any arrears owed 42.0% 38.8% 3.2%  * 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $4339 $5335 -$996  * 
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Receipt of Public Assistance by Custodial Parents 
The next set of outcomes addresses the question whether ICSS in Harris County led to 
decreased Public Assistance participation for the associated custodial parents (CPs) and their 
children.  ICSS impacts on public assistance receipt in Harris County is summarized in Table 15.  ICSS 
cases were no less likely to receive SNAP than were comparison group cases.  However, among 
cases that received SNAP, benefit levels averaged $18 less per month among ICSS cases than their 
comparison group counterparts.  Members of ICSS cases were also slightly less likely to be enrolled 
in Medicaid, and slightly less likely to receive TANF, than comparison group cases.  The public 
assistance effects listed here consist of mostly small impacts, but significant in relation to generally 
low rates of participation in these programs.  And importantly, the pattern of effects points to 
generally reduced reliance on public assistance among ICSS cases. 
                                                     
15 By way of comparison, the average follow-up duration for child support impacts in the Harris County sample 
was 9 months. 
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CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 15.2% 15.5% -0.3%   
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP $352 $370 -$18 ** 
CP receiving TANF benefits 1.0% 1.5% -0.5% ** 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 8.9% 9.7% -.8% ** 
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs 
Next we address the question whether ICSS child support enforcement is associated with 
increased employment rates and earnings levels among custodial and noncustodial parents.  As 
discussed previously, it would be difficult to make a strong argument that better and timelier child 
support enforcement should lead to better employment and earnings outcomes.  In fact, however, 
as shown in Table 16, we observe consistently positive impacts of ICSS on employment rates and 
earnings of both CPs and NCPs.  CPs in ICSS cases were 4.7 percentage points more likely to be 
employed, and they earned on average $533 per quarter more than those on comparison group 
cases.  Similarly, NCPs on cases participating in ICSS were 3.8 percentage points more likely to be 
employed, and employed NCPs earned on average $1328 more per quarter, as compared to those in 
the comparison group.  Since these differences are similar in magnitude to the historical differences 
in earnings noted previously for Harris County ICSS and comparison group cases (Table 5), they likely 
partly reflect a continuation of that trend, rather than exclusively an impact of ICSS. 











CP employed 65.3% 60.6% 4.7% ** 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $9348 $8815 $533 ** 
NCP employed 60.3% 56.5% 3.8% ** 
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed $12649 $11321 $1328 ** 




Other ICSS Counties:  Quasi-Experimental Impacts 
As noted, ICSS was also implemented in seventeen other counties aside from El Paso and 
Harris (see Table 1, earlier), and for thirteen of these counties the implementation occurred during a 
period that allowed us to form pre- and post-implementation groups of cases using administrative 
records data.  We include cases from these counties in the evaluation as part of a comparison group 
time-series design, which also includes cases from similarly situated non-ICSS counties, the matching 
and selection of which is described more fully in Appendix A.   
Results reported here for Other ICSS Counties could be analyzed using a treatment-control 
difference model, in essentially the same manner as done for the El Paso and Harris County results.  
However, since the non-ICSS county selection process has been improved significantly, and the more 
powerful difference-in-differences design allows better control for the passage of time, this 
approach will be relied upon here.  Using this difference-in-difference model, ICSS impacts in Other 
ICSS Counties are estimated by calculating how much more things changed in the ICSS counties after 
ICSS implementation than they changed in the non-ICSS comparison counties over the same period.  
Since many more numbers are involved in this estimation, and it is more complicated, most details 
are relegated to tables in the Appendix, while only the ICSS impact estimates and the statistical 
significance thereof are shown in the tables in this section. 
Collection of Child Support 
As shown in Table 17, ICSS cases in Other ICSS Counties were 3 percentage points more 
likely to receive child support through either FS or RO channels, as compared to comparison group 
cases.  Furthermore, the total dollar amount of child support collections in Other ICSS Counties, 
when looking only at cases that made a payment in a given month, was $75 per month higher than 
the same figure for comparison cases.  That is, the increased dollar amount of child support 
collections associated with ICSS was significantly greater than the increased amount of child support 









Any FS child support collections made 7.3% ** 
Any RO child support collections made -4.4% ** 
Any child support collections made, either type 3.0% ** 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $75 ** 
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Finally, when looking at measures intended to capture delinquency of child support 
payments, the difference-in-difference model reveals no impact of ICSS on the rate of money 
judgments, nor on any of the arrears measures.  This is interesting because the arrears measures are 
biased against ICSS due to inability to know arrears balances among RO cases that are more 
common in the comparison group throughout their case histories.  Furthermore, the average follow-
up duration for arrears measured here for Other ICSS Counties is about 55 months, or almost five 
years, so these are longer-term outcomes closer to the time scale on which arrears impacts might be 
expected.16  Thus, it is possible that the true arrears balances in comparison group cases have gotten 
to the point where many of them are converting to FS cases in order to help with collections, and 
their arrears become documented in the process.  If this happens enough, it could overcome the 
short-term positive arrears impacts seen in other sites, and yield a zero-impact estimate as seen 
here.  It is an interesting possibility, but impossible to prove without additional data. 





Money judgment made in child support case -0.1%   
Any arrears owed -0.5%   
Total arrears, among those who owe any -$410   
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
                                                     
16 In comparison, the average follow-up duration for child support impacts in the Other ICSS Counties sample 
was 87 months. 
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Receipt of Public Assistance by Custodial Parents 
The next set of outcomes addresses the question whether ICSS led to decreased Public 
Assistance participation for the associated custodial parents (CPs) and their children.  Public 
Assistance receipt in Other ICSS Counties is summarized in Table 19.  Very much like the patterns 
seen in El Paso and Harris Counties, the estimated ICSS impact in Other ICSS Counties was in the 
direction of lesser receipt of SNAP, TANF, or Medicaid among ICSS cases.  Average SNAP benefit 
receipt levels were unaffected by ICSS. 





CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits -5.2% ** 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP -$3   
CP receiving TANF benefits -0.5% ** 
CP enrolled in Medicaid -3.9% ** 
  Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs 
Finally we examine the question whether ICSS child support enforcement is associated with 
increased employment rates and earnings levels among custodial and noncustodial parents (see 
Table 20).  Similar to Harris County, we found both increased employment rates and earnings levels 
among the employed for CPs.  And similar to both Harris and El Paso Counties, we found both 
increased employment and earnings among NCPs attributable to ICSS.   
Table 20. Other ICSS Counties Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs 
Outcome 
ICSS Impact 
(diff. in diff.) 
CP employed 1.9% ** 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $1,189 ** 
NCP employed 2.3% ** 
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed $2,884 ** 





Impact Variation by Subgroups 
One of the goals of the ICSS evaluation was to determine to what extent the 
implementation of ICSS differentially impacted subgroups of interest, including those of Hispanic 
ethnicity or who are members of the military.  As described earlier, problems with the data quality 
of the military and Hispanic indicators necessitated the development of an alternative method of 
addressing these questions.  The solution was to conduct the subgroup analysis at the county level, 
by dividing the Other ICSS Counties into groups of those with low (25%) and high (70%) percentages 
of Hispanic CPs and NCPs.  A similar grouping was done for the military measure, including El Paso 
along with the Other ICSS Counties, yielding groups of counties with low (2.3%) and moderate (7.6%) 
percentages of military members among CPs and NCPs.  The next two sections include testing for 
ICSS impact variation due to members of these two subgroups. 
Hispanics 
In this section a difference-in-difference estimator is used to determine the extent to which 
impacts of ICSS varied according to the concentration of Hispanic CPs and NCPs.  It does this by 
answering the question how much bigger the impact of ICSS is among high Hispanic counties than it 
is in low Hispanic counties.  As with the difference-in-difference estimates cited earlier, in the Other 
ICSS Counties impacts section, we include only the difference-in-difference estimate here, and leave 
the detailed table for the Appendix (Table B-9). 







Any FS child support collections made -5.3% ** 
Any RO child support collections made 1.7% ** 
Any child support collections made, either type -3.7% ** 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $54 ** 
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
According to Table 21, the Hispanic differential impact of ICSS on any collection of child 
support was negative (-3.7%), meaning that ICSS tended to increase the frequency of collections 
more in low-Hispanic counties than it did in high-Hispanic counties.  This is somewhat smaller than 
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the impact of ICSS measured for these other counties (4.9%)17, so the total impact of ICSS on 
collections in high Hispanic counties was still positive, just less positive than in low Hispanic 
counties.  Table 21 also indicates that, among those making payments in any given month, the 
Hispanic differential impact of ICSS on the amount of child support paid was positive.  This means 
that ICSS increased the dollar amount of child support paid more in high Hispanic counties than in 
low Hispanic counties. 







Money judgment made in child support case 0.0%  
Any arrears owed -7.2% ** 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $492  * 
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Next, Table 22 shows the Hispanic differential impact of ICSS on money judgments and child 
support arrears.  The findings here indicate that ICSS was seven percentage points less likely to lead 
to arrears in high Hispanic counties, as compared to its impact in low Hispanic counties.  But among 
cases with arrears, ICSS lead to higher arrears balances ($492 higher) among high Hispanic counties 
than among low Hispanic counties. 






CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits -9.8% ** 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP -$59 ** 
CP receiving TANF benefits -0.4% ** 
CP enrolled in Medicaid -6.2% ** 
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
                                                     
17 This 4.9% value is from the comparable simple outcomes model for Other ICSS Counties (see Appendix B, 




Recall that the impact of ICSS on public assistance receipt in Other ICSS Counties was found 
to be uniformly negative.  The Hispanic differential impact of ICSS on public assistance receipt, as 
shown in Table 23, was also found to be uniformly negative.  This means that, whereas ICSS led to 
less public assistance receipt overall, the effect was even greater among high Hispanic counties.  






CP employed .5% ** 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $1,015 ** 
NCP employed 0.1%   
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed $1,244 ** 
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG, and TWC administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Similarly, recall from the Other ICSS Counties impact section that the impact of ICSS on 
employment and earnings of CPs and NCPs was found to be uniformly positive.  The Hispanic 
differential impact of ICSS on employment and earnings, shown in Table 24, was also positive for 
every indicator except NCP employment.  This means that, for the most part, the impact of ICSS on 
employment and earnings was even more positive among high Hispanic counties than among low 
Hispanic counties. 
Military Members 
As with the Hispanic analysis, a difference-in-difference estimator is also used to determine 
the extent to which impacts of ICSS varied according to the concentration of members of the 
military among CPs and NCPs in each county.  This estimator answers the question how much bigger 
the impact of ICSS is in counties serving moderate shares of military members than it is in counties 
serving low shares of members of the military.  Henceforth these will be referred to as moderate 
military and low military counties.  As with the previous treatment of difference-in-difference 
analysis, we include only the difference-in-difference estimate in tables here, while a table with 
detailed results is in the Appendix (Table B-10). 
Recall that the effects of ICSS on child support collections in Other ICSS Counties and El Paso 
were positive, indicating greater likelihood of collections being made, and higher dollar amounts of 
collections due to ICSS.  According to Table 25, ICSS impacts on frequency and amount of child 
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support collections was even greater among moderate military counties, as compared to low 
military counties.  Thus, ICSS leads to even more frequent child support collections, of greater 
amounts, in areas with more members of the military on the caseload. 







Any FS child support collections made 1.0% ** 
Any RO child support collections made -0.4% ** 
Any child support collections made, either type 0.7% ** 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $61 ** 
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Similarly, recall that there was no significant impact of ICSS on money judgments and 
arrears in Other ICSS Counties.  As shown in Table 26, the military differential impact of ICSS was 
negative on both judgments (-0.1%) and whether any arrears are owed (-7.5%).  Thus, even with an 
arrears measure that is known to be biased against ICSS, the program leads to clearly reduced 
arrears and money judgments in areas with moderate concentrations of military members among 
child support caseloads. 






Money judgment made in child support case -0.1% ** 
Any arrears owed -7.5% ** 
Total arrears, among those who owe any -$218   
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Likewise, recall that for all measures ICSS was found to negatively impact public assistance 
receipt on Other ICSS Counties.  The military differential impact of ICSS on public assistance, as 
shown in Table 27, was also uniformly negative.  That is, while ICSS was found to lead to less public 
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assistance receipt overall, the effect was magnified in areas serving greater shares of military 
members, and the reduction in public assistance was even greater. 






CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits -12.2% ** 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP -$71 ** 
CP receiving TANF benefits -0.4% ** 
CP enrolled in Medicaid -7.7% ** 
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Finally, recall that the impacts of ICSS on employment and earnings of CPs and NCPs in 
Other ICSS Counties was uniformly positive.  Once again, Table 28 shows that the military 
differential impact of ICSS was also uniformly positive across all four indicators.  Thus ICSS can be 
said to lead to even greater levels of employment and earnings of the employed CPs and NCPs in 
areas with higher shares of military members. 







CP employed 2.6% ** 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $1,073 ** 
NCP employed 4.0% ** 
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed $1,472 ** 
 Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG, and TWC administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
 
Alternative Arrears Analysis 
One of the more important expected outcomes from ICSS was that enforcing child support 
cases early would help to prevent the buildup of arrears.  Unfortunately, the arrears measure, with 
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its inherent bias against the ICSS treatment group, was never up to the task of measuring the impact 
of ICSS on arrears in an impartial way.  Instead of revealing the expected impact on arrears, this 
measure that can only detect arrears balances on full-service cases showed essentially the opposite.  
In the two sites reporting short-term (1-2 year) findings, El Paso and Harris, impacts on arrears were 
reported to be positive, meaning ICSS appears to have led to increased arrears.  But arrears 
avoidance was always a longer-term prospect, and in fact the findings in Other ICSS Counties 
confirmed that at around five years the impacts on arrears were essentially zero despite the bias in 
the measure.  It is tempting to conclude that the measured impact of ICSS on arrears grows more 
positive with longer-term follow-up, on the assumption that it takes a while for arrears to grow to 
the point where custodial parents are convinced to open a full-service case to collect them.  But the 
flawed arrears measure may not be capable of confirming this interpretation within the time frames 
available. 
Another approach to discerning the impact of ICSS on arrears was attempted based on a 
comment in Sorensen’s (2007) definitive paper on the topic of child support arrears.  The key 
observation was that “obligors who had their IV-D cases opened around the same time as their 
order was established tended to owe considerably less arrears than other obligors” (p. 6).  Opening 
cases early is in fact the primary tool of ICSS.  So if it can be shown that 1) cases in ICSS sites do tend 
to be opened closer to their order establishment dates, and 2) cases in Texas that were opened 
within a year of the order establishment date have lower arrears balances many years later, then it 
may be possible to show the expected arrears effect without waiting for five more years of follow-
up data to accumulate. 
Figure 7. Prompt Case Opening in Harris County 
 
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  
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 Figure 7 illustrates an analysis of cases in Harris County before and after the courts through 
which they were processed converted to ICSS (this figure collapses the analysis across courts).  The 
important component is the green band in the middle, which indicates what share of cases were 
opened within a year of their orders being established.  In a confirmation of the expected pattern, 
prior to ICSS implementation, 40% of cases were opened within a year of their orders being 
established, but after ICSS was introduced, 53% of cases were opened within a year. 
Similar analysis was done for the Other ICSS Counties, and the results are shown in Figure 8.  
Once again confirming the expected pattern, in 12 out of 13 counties the percent of cases opened 
within a year of their orders being established increased after implementation of ICSS (in Upshur 
County the percent was unchanged).  The average increase was over eleven percentage points.  So 
this confirms the first point: cases under ICSS are more likely to be opened within a year of their 
order establishment. 
To address the second point, we casted a wide net and analyzed arrears balances for all 
active child support cases statewide, regardless of whether they had a connection to ICSS.  Table 29 
shows the results of this analysis.  First, to roughly control for how long cases have been open, we 
divided them into three broad date ranges to include cases opening between 2001 and 2005, 2006 
to 2010, and 2011 to 2015.  Within each date range, we divided cases into the same three groups 
based on when their cases opened relative to when their orders were established.  We then 
calculated the median arrears balances among these cases as of the latest available arrears data 
(February 2016). 
As expected, in all three date ranges the lowest median arrears balance was found among 
group 2, those whose child support cases were opened on the same day or within a year after their 
order being established.  The largest arrears balances, about three times larger, were consistently 
seen among those whose cases were opened much later than the order establishment date or 
never.  And the next largest arrears balances, about twice as large as group 2, were seen among 
those whose case was opened first without an order established yet.  This conclusively 
demonstrates the second point, that cases in Texas that were opened within a year of the order 





Figure 8. Prompt Case Opening in Other ICSS Counties 
 
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  
Taken together, these two pieces of evidence strongly suggest that implementation of ICSS 
will lead to lower arrears balances in the long run.  ICSS does cause child support cases to be opened 
closer to their order establishment dates, and if historical patterns hold, they will have lower arrears 
because of it. 
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Table 29. Statewide Arrears Analysis 




1 = Case opened first, order entered never or after a year 32,156 $7,699 
2 = Case & Order entered same day or within a year 73,804 $3,339 
3 = Order entered first, Case opened never or after a year 54,081 $9,115 
2006-2010 
1 = Case opened first, order entered never or after a year 87,774 $5,545 
2 = Case & Order entered same day or within a year 269,056 $2,672 
3 = Order entered first, Case opened never or after a year 57,320 $9,455 
2011-2015 
1 = Case opened first, order entered never or after a year 32,957 $2,786 
2 = Case & Order entered same day or within a year 241,590 $1,530 
3 = Order entered first, Case opened never or after a year 23,137 $6,128 






This section aims to provide a sense of the experiences of those who choose to opt-out of 
IV-D child support collection services.  The work presented below was originally included in an 
earlier report, but has been updated to include more outcome measures and to extend the follow-
up interval by almost a year.  We take two strategies in answering the question of how the child 
support experience varies for those who opt-out.  First, we examine a sample of reasons that 
customers gave when completing forms signifying their intention to opt-out.  There are limitations 
to this approach, of course.  The ‘reason’ question was listed as optional on the form, and the 
sample was more of a convenience sample than random, so it would be difficult to draw inferences 
from this analysis to the statewide population of those opting-out.  Nevertheless, the kinds of 
reasons people give can be informative.  Second, through analysis of administrative data we 
examine the experiences of those apparently opting-out from IV-D services in any of the ICSS 
implementation sites we have been focusing on thus far: El Paso, Harris, or Other ICSS Counties. 
Opt-out Reasons Cited 
The opt-out form data we received from the OAG covered a period of four years, from 2010 
to 2014, and included cases from fourteen counties: Bexar, Cameron, Dallas, Ector, El Paso, Harris, 
Hidalgo, Lubbock, Midland, Smith, Tarrant, Taylor, Travis, Webb, and Wichita.   The dataset included 
information on the case ID, county, office code, the opt-out date and the opt-out reason. As in 
previous reporting periods, most of the custodial parents who declined IV-D services (55%, or 717 of 
the total 1,371 responses) did not provide a reason for doing so on these “Opt-out” forms.   Another 
sixteen percent of those served were already receiving child support through direct payments from 
the NCP or through other official systems such as military allotments or social security.   The reasons 
provided by the remaining respondents (29%) for their decision to opt-out of IV-D services are 
summarized in Figure 9.  
The most common reason reported for opting-out of services (31%) identified some type of 
informal “agreement” between NCP and CP that may include the NCP making cash contributions to 
the CP household through the payment of rent, clothing and child care or noncash payments in the 
form of providing child care.  The majority of these responses did not provide specifics regarding the 
nature of the “agreement” held between the CP and NCP (132 out of 140 responses).   Nineteen 
percent of CPs responding indicated that they did not want nor need the support.   
 
50 
Figure 9. Opt-out Reasons 
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG records.  Number of respondents listing a reason: 440. 
Eighteen percent of the opt-out respondents listed the behavior or status of the NCP as the 
reason for opting-out of services.   The majority of these responses discussed the NCPs inability to 
pay due to: 
• unemployment,  
• incarceration,  
• disability,  
• drug and alcohol addiction, and 
• health and mental health issues.    
Only one respondent in this category listed family violence as the reason for their decision 
to opt-out.  For the remainder who opt-out citing the NCP’s inability to pay, there seems to be little 
recognition that for many NCPs these are likely to be temporary factors. 
Mistrust or concerns with the OAG was identified by only three percent of the respondents 
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responses identified the delay in payments from the OAG as their reason for opting-out while the 
remainder of the responses in this category expressed mistrust in the system, unwillingness to 
attend a court date, or unhappiness in general with OAG services.  A few, one percent, identified the 
status of the CP as deployed or out of the state or country, as their reason for opting-out of services.  
For some the family structure had changed (eleven percent), parents reconciled or remarried, 
children moved to reside with the NCP or had been emancipated.  Finally, eight percent of the 
responses did not align with the clustered categories of responses and were labeled as “other.” 
As mentioned previously, the opt-out forms we analyzed should be regarded as a 
convenience sample.  The date range covered by the forms is only about five years, as compared to 
over twelve years of administrative data, and it has been reported that not all local offices send their 
opt-out forms to the state office, from where we collect them.  Furthermore, the ‘reason’ question 
was listed as optional on the form, and only a fraction of respondents completed it.  Thus, although 
these data do give a very good sense of the range of reasons people might offer for having opted 
out, it is difficult to make strong inferences from this analysis to draw conclusions about the 
statewide population of those opting-out.  Instead, we can draw limited inferences from an analysis 
of administrative data focusing on those apparently opting-out from IV-D services in any of the ICSS 
implementation sites included in this study, to which we turn our attention next. 
Opt-outs Identified through Administrative Data 
In order to identify through administrative records data the cases of CPs who were likely to 
have opted out, we examined a file of case type histories over time.  We focused exclusively on ICSS 
treatment group cases, or those cases that opened in one of the ICSS sites, El Paso, Harris, or one of 
the Other ICSS Counties, in the post-ICSS implementation year.  Since the default action in these 
ICSS areas was for new cases to be full-service (FS), we determined that any cases that opened in 
registry-only (RO) status or became RO within the first calendar month were opt-outs.  We tracked 
the outcomes for these cases as long as they remained RO cases.  Second, we identified additional 
opt-out cases based on those whose status was initially FS but changed to RO at a later date.  For 
this group, we tracked their outcomes starting in the month of their initial RO status and continuing 





Table 30. Comparing Apparent Opt-Outs to Cases that Remained Full-Service 
  Opted Out 
Remained 
Full Service   
All cases, demographics N=2,343 N=27,574   
NCP age (years) 36.9 34.3 ** 
NCP is female 27.1% 10.4% ** 
NCP is Hispanic 13.1% 31.2% ** 
NCP is black 5.3% 27.3% ** 
NCP race/ethnicity unknown 64.8% 14.4% ** 
NCP is current or former military 1.0% 3.6% ** 
CP age (years) 37.9 32.9 ** 
CP is Hispanic 9.6% 31.0% ** 
CP is black 3.6% 24.5% ** 
CP race/ethnicity unknown 74.1% 16.2% ** 
CP is current or former military 0.6% 0.5%   
Number of children 1.0 1.2 ** 
Age of youngest child, years 8.2 6.1 ** 
Age of oldest child, years 9.5 7.3 ** 
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history       
NCP employed at case opening 52.3% 59.7% ** 
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters 51.7% 58.3% ** 
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $8,053 $6,554 ** 
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters 20.4% 26.3% ** 
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters) 25.7 28.3 ** 
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 50.4% 57.4% ** 
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year 3.5% 6.6% ** 
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 3.6% 4.6% * 
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year 5.4% 5.8%   
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.3% 0.1%   
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.2% 0.2%   
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 5.1% 5.0%   
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history       
CP employed at case opening 54.5% 64.0% ** 
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters 51.9% 61.0% ** 
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $5,978 $5,039 ** 
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters 15.2% 24.2% ** 
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters) 24.7 27.3 ** 
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  Opted Out 
Remained 
Full Service   
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 52.1% 60.7% ** 
CP filed for unemployment within prior year 2.6% 5.8% ** 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 4.7% 18.4% ** 
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year 4.1% 18.8% ** 
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.0% 1.1% ** 
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.1% 1.4% ** 
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 5.7% 23.3% ** 
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG, TWC, and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.  
*=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Table 30 compares the characteristics of cases identified using this method as having opted 
out against those that remained in full service (FS) status.  Cases that opted out of enforcement 
services were more likely to be headed by older parents with older children, and were less likely to 
be black or Hispanic.  Cases that opted-out were far more likely to have a female NCP.  On the other 
hand, when the NCP was in the military they were substantially more likely to remain FS cases.   
Members of cases that opted out of IV-D services were less likely to be employed in UI-
covered jobs, but also less likely to have experienced an earnings dip, and when employed they 
tended to earn more than members of cases remaining in full service status.  Members of opt-out 
cases were less likely to receive benefits of any kind, whether unemployment or SNAP, Medicaid, or 
TANF.   
Outcomes among Opt-Outs 
One must carefully interpret any outcomes seen among those who opt-out of ICSS child 
support enforcement, for this is purely a correlational design, and we have little idea whether 
opting-out led to these outcomes or the outcomes caused the opt-outs.  It is likely that at least a bit 
of both occurred.  With this caveat in mind, the patterns revealed are quite interesting.  Note that 
the following tables track cases over time differently than anywhere else in this report.  In the 
impact tables in previous sections, cases are tracked only according to their initial status, regardless 
of subsequent opt-outs or opt-ins that might happen.  In this section, when examining opt-outs, 
those who opt-out are tabulated in the left column during case-months in which they remain in RO 
status, but are tabulated in the right column in all FS periods, including any time before opting-out 
and after returning to FS status, if applicable.  We also cluster the results differently, to aid in the 
examination of related outcomes across sites.  Table 31 shows child support outcomes comparing 
 
54 
those who opt-out against those who remain FS cases in three panels, one each for El Paso, Harris, 
and Other ICSS Counties. 
Table 31. Apparent Opt-Outs, Child Support Collections 







El Paso         
Any FS child support collections made 10.2% 66.3% -56.1% ** 
Any RO child support collections made 14.7% 0.4% 14.3% ** 
Any child support collections made, either type 24.7% 66.6% -41.9% ** 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $1210 $921 $289 ** 
Harris County         
Any FS child support collections made 1.0% 50.7% -49.7% ** 
Any RO child support collections made 30.5% 2.1% 28.4% ** 
Any child support collections made, either type 31.0% 52.6% -21.6% ** 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $860 $662 $198 ** 
Other ICSS Counties         
Any FS child support collections made 0.4% 45.5% -45.1% ** 
Any RO child support collections made 18.8% 1.3% 17.5% ** 
Any child support collections made, either type 19.1% 46.6% -27.5% ** 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $703 $606 $97 ** 
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
From this table it is apparent that opting-out of IV-D enforcement is associated with large 
reductions in the frequency of child support collections observed, regardless of site.  The evidence 
on the amount of child support collected is more mixed, with those opt-outs who do make 
payments in El Paso and Harris paying more on average, but the opposite pattern is seen in the 
Other ICSS Counties.  The evidence is also mixed on money judgments, with higher rates among opt-
outs in El Paso, but drastically reduced chances of having a money judgment in Harris or Other ICSS 
Counties. 
Similarly, child support arrears and money judgment outcomes are shown in Table 32, 
comparing those who opt-out against those who remain FS cases in three panels, one each for El 
Paso, Harris, and Other ICSS Counties.  In Harris and the Other ICSS Counties, those who opt-out 
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were less likely to have a money judgment against them.  And in all sites, those who opt-out were 
far less likely to have any documented arrears balances, a finding which may not be informative as it 
is completely expected based on the bias in the arrears measure. 
Table 32. Apparent Opt-Outs, Child Support Judgments and Arrears 







El Paso         
Money judgment made in child support case 0.0% 0.2% -0.2%   
Any arrears owed 7.3% 45.0% -37.7% ** 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $7686 $3467 $4219   
Harris County         
Money judgment made in child support case 0.0% 0.3% -0.3% ** 
Any arrears owed 4.5% 46.4% -41.9% ** 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $1416 $3832 -$2416   
Other ICSS Counties         
Money judgment made in child support case 0.0% 0.4% -0.4% ** 
Any arrears owed 0.7% 46.3% -45.6% ** 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $7866 $8212 -$346   
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
 
Table 33 compares the public assistance outcomes by site for those who opted out of ICSS 
versus those who remained FS cases.  Uniformly across sites, those who opted out were far less 
likely to receive public assistance, whether SNAP or TANF, or Medicaid.  
Table 33. Apparent Opt-Outs, Public Assistance Receipt 







El Paso         
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 2.7% 15.8% -13.1% ** 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP $335 $350 -$15   
CP receiving TANF benefits         
Percent of time CP receiving TANF benefits 0.1% 1.1% -1.0% ** 
Harris County         
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CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 2.7% 15.8% -13.1% ** 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP $335 $350 -$15   
CP receiving TANF benefits 0.1% 1.1% -1.0% ** 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 1.7% 9.2% -7.5% ** 
Other ICSS Counties         
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 5.3% 18.3% -13.0% ** 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP $336 $395 -$59 ** 
CP receiving TANF benefits 0.1% 0.7% -0.6% ** 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 3.7% 14.6% -10.9% ** 




Employment and earnings outcomes among those who opted out or those who chose to 
remain IV-D customers are tabulated by site in Table 34.  The general pattern among the three sites 
on these measures is remarkably consistent, and it echoes the pattern seen in the initial 
characteristics at case opening of those who later opted out (Table 30).  That is, we see a reduced 
likelihood of being employed in UI covered work among those who opt-out, but those who are 
employed tend to have higher earnings.  The implication at this point seems to be that at least a 
portion of the opt-outs occur among cases in which either the CP earns enough not to need strict 
enforcement, or the NCP earns enough that payments are made without strict enforcement, or 
both. 
 
Table 34. Apparent Opt-Outs, Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs 







El Paso         
CP employed 46.5% 51.0% -4.5%   
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $9403 $9387 $16   
NCP employed 20.8% 43.1% -22.3% ** 
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed $18652 $16808 $1844   
Harris County         
CP employed 60.3% 65.8% -5.5% ** 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $13834 $9150 $4684 ** 
NCP employed 49.8% 62.0% -12.2% ** 
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed $19340 $12399 $6941 ** 
Other ICSS Counties         
CP employed 50.7% 60.8% -10.1% ** 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $12102 $9161 $2941 ** 
NCP employed 44.5% 55.0% -10.5% ** 
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed $16355 $11674 $4681 ** 




OPT IN ANALYSIS 
This section attempts to describe the experiences of those who opt into IV-D child support 
collection services.  We analyze the administrative data and examine the experiences of those 
apparently opting into IV-D services in any of the Other ICSS Counties.  In order to identify the cases 
of CPs who likely opted in, we examined a file of case type histories over time.  We focused 
exclusively on pre-ICSS comparison group cases, or those cases that opened in one of the Other ICSS 
Counties, in the pre-ICSS implementation year.  Since the default action in this pre-ICSS time period 
was for new cases to be registry-only (RO), we determined that any non-public assistance cases that 
opened in full-service (FS) status or became FS at any point in the future were opt-ins.   
Using this criteria, we identified over ten thousand cases that opted in within the Other ICSS 
Counties comparison group, and we compare them against over four thousand cases that opened as 
mandatory full service cases in the same counties over the same interval.  On average, about 95% of 
identified opt-in cases either opened in full-service status or opted-in during the first month, and 
only 5% chose to opt-in later. 
Table 35 compares the characteristics of those who apparently opted-in against those who 
were mandatory full-service cases.  Opt-ins are younger and more likely to be male18, and more 
likely to be employed but at lower wages.  Opt-ins are also more likely to have experienced recent 
economic distress in the form of a dip in earnings, and are more likely to receive public assistance of 
any kind. 






Full Service   
All cases, demographics N=10,958 N=4,126   
NCP age (years) 32.1 36.4 ** 
NCP is female 12.0% 19.9% ** 
NCP is Hispanic 39.6% 12.7% ** 
NCP is black 25.7% 6.9% ** 
NCP race/ethnicity unknown 7.4% 68.7% ** 
NCP is current or former military 3.9% 1.2% ** 
CP age (years) 31.1 35.7 ** 
                                                     
18 Race and ethnicity are too frequently unknown in this comparison to interpret the patterns of differences 








Full Service   
CP is Hispanic 40.8% 9.7% ** 
CP is black 22.7% 5.0% ** 
CP race/ethnicity unknown 7.8% 76.4% ** 
CP is current or former military 0.9% 0.3% ** 
Number of children 1.4 1.2 ** 
Age of youngest child, years 5.0 7.7 ** 
Age of oldest child, years 6.2 9.2 ** 
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history       
NCP employed at case opening 57.9% 53.3% ** 
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters 57.6% 53.5% ** 
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $4,836 $8,658 ** 
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters 29.0% 20.1% ** 
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters) 28.2 26.2 ** 
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 56.1% 52.9% ** 
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year 7.3% 4.8% ** 
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 8.2% 3.0% ** 
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year 8.5% 3.1% ** 
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.1% 0.1%   
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.3% 0.3%   
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 4.5% 2.5% ** 
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history       
CP employed at case opening 61.7% 56.3% ** 
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters 58.9% 54.1% ** 
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $4,067 $5,667 ** 
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 quarters 24.4% 14.3% ** 
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters) 26.4 24.6 ** 
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 57.9% 54.4% ** 
CP filed for unemployment within prior year 6.0% 3.5% ** 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 23.0% 4.3% ** 
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year 20.3% 3.9% ** 
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.1% 0.0% ** 
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year 1.2% 0.2% ** 
Percent of time CP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 9.8% 2.9% ** 




Looking next at outcomes among those who opted-in, the same caution used with opt-outs 
is necessary.  One must carefully interpret outcomes among those who opt-in to child support 
enforcement.  As before, this is a correlational design, so we will not be able to determine to what 
extent opting-in led to these outcomes or to what extent the outcomes led case members to opt-in.   
Table 36 shows child support outcomes comparing those who opted-in against those who 
were mandatory full service cases in Other ICSS Counties.  Those who opted-in to full service were 
more likely to have child support collections, but the average collection amounts among cases 
paying at all were lower for opt-ins.   
Table 36. Apparent Opt-Ins, Child Support Collections 
Outcome 








Any FS child support collections made 36.5% 1.1% 35.4% ** 
Any RO child support collections made 3.6% 25.1% -21.5% ** 
Any child support collections made, either type 40.0% 26.2% 13.8% ** 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $527 $783 -$256 ** 
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Next, Table 37 shows money judgments and child support arrears balances comparing 
apparent opt-ins against mandatory FS cases.  Not surprisingly, cases that opted-in were both more 
likely to have a money judgment and more likely to have child support arrears due. 
Table 37. Apparent Opt-Ins, Child Support Judgments and Arrears 
Outcome 








Money judgment made in child support case 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% ** 
Any arrears owed 44.5% 2.9% 41.6% ** 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $8643 $9775 -$1132   
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Table 38 compares public assistance benefit outcomes for those opting-in against those who 
were mandatory full service.  Similar to the differences in historical characteristics of these two 
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groups noted above in Table 35, opt-ins continue to show greater utilization of public assistance 
programs, including SNAP, TANF, or Medicaid. 
Table 38. Apparent Opt-Ins, Public Assistance Receipt 
Outcome 








CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 23.4% 5.0% 18.4% ** 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP $409 $358 $51 ** 
CP receiving TANF benefits 1.1% 0.3% 0.8% ** 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 17.5% 3.8% 13.7% ** 
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
Finally, Table 39 shows similar trends as seen prior to their case opening when comparing 
the outcomes of those who opt-in against mandatory FS cases.  Once again, members of opt-in 
cases were more likely to be employed but earning lower wages, relative to mandatory cases.  
Table 39. Apparent Opt-Ins, Employment and Earnings of CPs and NCPs 
Outcome 








CP employed 58.7% 52.4% 6.3% ** 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $8076 $12131 -$4055 ** 
NCP employed 52.0% 47.3% 4.7% ** 
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed $9444 $17662 -$8218 ** 










The implementation of ICSS has clearly led to small but significant changes in the 
composition of the full service caseload.  As noted, our approach has evolved to the point of 
recognizing that changes in the caseload composition are an impact of ICSS.  It is by now clear that a 
system of deemed applications and default enrollment yields a IV-D caseload that is slightly but not 
dramatically more affluent.  For example, both CPs and NCPs had greater employment and earnings 
histories as of their case opening dates, as evidenced on multiple measures, relative to members of 
the comparison group.  On other aspects the evidence of a shift in the caseload was more mixed.  
Changes in prior experience with SNAP and Medicaid were inconsistent across sites, though there 
was agreement across sites on reduced CP use of TANF.  Thus, the conclusion that the caseload 
shifted in the direction of more affluence is warranted, but the shift was not dramatic.     
From a purely academic standpoint, the changing composition of the caseload complicates 
the task of sorting out the impacts.  It is certainly an interesting problem to attempt to distinguish 
how much of the positive differences one sees are due to caseload changes induced by ICSS 
implementation, and how much are due to the enhanced enforcement tools and more proactive 
approach to child support collection.  Practically speaking, however, the question is moot.  If an 
administrator wants to implement a program like this, it matters little why the individual impacts 
happen.  What matters more is knowing how the program will operate under new rules and a 
slightly different caseload, and what its results look like. 
From more of a statistical perspective, acknowledging the fact that ICSS changes the 
caseload composition, and being OK with it, are critical to computing fair estimates of the program’s 
impact.  In earlier reports we made attempts, somewhat misguided in retrospect, to statistically 
control for characteristics of individuals and cases in order to clarify experimental impact estimates.  
But in doing so, we unintentionally eliminated some of the effects we were looking for.  This, 
together with other changes and improvements implemented over the course of this multi-year 
evaluation have inevitably led to changes in the results with each successive report.  We are now 
confident that the results presented here are the best we can accomplish within the constraints of 
the data available, including an unusual missing / unknown data structure caused by blindness of 
the data system to various aspects of registry-only cases.  Whereas some of our prior efforts may 
have reduced any observed positive changes induced by ICSS, the estimates herein represent the 
best guess at what an administrator implementing a program like this can expect to see.  
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Several changes made for the final report represent significant improvements over prior 
impact estimates.  For example, the difference-in-differences model used to estimate impacts for 
Other ICSS Counties has been improved by the addition of better county-level measures to the 
matching model, resulting in greater similarity of matched counties on dimensions important to 
child support (e.g., fertility rate).  This is important because using cases from other non-ICSS 
counties helps to control for the passage of time, which is perhaps the biggest threat to internal 
validity in a simple pre-post comparison design.  Without controlling for time, it is difficult to be sure 
that the changes in Other ICSS Counties were due solely to ICSS implementation.  With these 
improvements in place, we now rely on the difference-in-difference estimator for all estimates of 
ICSS impacts in these counties.  For comparison, the pre-post estimates are also included here 
(Appendix B, Table B-7); the difference between the two sets of results is more a matter of degree 
than quality.   
Similarly, refinement of the analysis of ICSS in Harris County was necessary due to the 
conversion of existing cases into ICSS cases upon ICSS implementation.  Previously, when we 
examined long-term (5 year plus) impacts, existing cases in Harris County may have been serving as 
comparison cases when they were converted to ICSS.  To the extent that this happened, it would 
have depressed the impacts, as it would have blurred the distinction between ICSS and comparison 
cases.  By limiting our analysis in this final report to impacts occurring in the first year after case 
opening, we avoid such problems.  This had the unfortunate effect of losing one source of longer-
term impact estimates, but the improvements in the Other ICSS Counties model allow it to help fill 
this gap. 
Finally, the effort to sub-divide El Paso impacts to focus on those randomly assigned later in 
the process was well-intentioned but made little difference in the end.  The theory was that case 
workers needed some time to get familiar with the new tools available to them under ICSS, and thus 
outcomes for later cases might be better.  This ‘learning curve’ theory received some support in the 
area of child support collections, which were indeed better among cases randomly assigned in the 
second half of the enrollment period, but overall the differences between the two sets of results 
were not dramatic.  As a result, we have focused our discussion of El Paso on the overall impacts 
among all cases. 
In light of these improvements, the overall pattern of impacts among the El Paso, Harris, and 
Other ICSS Counties sites is remarkably similar.  Child support collections were increased in all sites, 
sometimes dramatically.  Combining two data sources, registry only and full-service, to measure 
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collections has improved the estimation but has not completely eliminated the problem that some 
payments made outside the state disbursement unit (which is contrary to policy) may be missed.  
We have no direct evidence that such payments are made, nor how frequently if they are.  We can 
confidently conclude, at a minimum, that ICSS has dramatically increased the evidence of 
documented payment of child support.  If such improvements were illusory, then we might not 
expect to see improvements in public assistance. 
Observed impacts of ICSS on public assistance and other benefit receipt was also remarkably 
consistent and positive.   Unlike child support collections, public assistance can be equally measured 
for both groups regardless of their full-service status within the OAG caseload, so there is no bias in 
these measures.  Across sites, ICSS case members were less likely to receive SNAP, received less 
SNAP benefits, or both.  Receipt of TANF was similarly reduced in all sites that had enough TANF 
receipt to measure the impact of ICSS on this outcome.  Even receipt of Medicaid was consistently 
reduced across all sites.  Moreover, these reductions cannot be solely attributed to shifts in the 
composition of the caseload, since as noted the changes among caseload members in prior 
experience with SNAP and Medicaid were inconsistent across sites.  The fact that all public 
assistance outcomes were improved under ICSS also bolsters confidence in the findings of consistent 
improvements in child support collections, since non-receipt of child support is a big factor in need 
for public assistance. 
Estimated impacts of ICSS implementation on employment and earnings measures were 
strong and positive in Harris and Other ICSS Counties.  Both increased employment rates and 
earnings levels among the employed were seen for both CPs and NCPs in these sites.  El Paso, on the 
other hand, showed more mixed employment and earnings findings.  The difference here is difficult 
to explain, however, it is not uncommon to see increased employment among some populations 
paired with a finding that those newly employed are earning less, due perhaps to low entry-level 
wages.  Most of the improvements in employment are likely due to the shift in the caseload toward 
those with more attachment to the labor market. 
Finally, the impact of ICSS on child support arrears was difficult to ascertain.  Since arrears 
balances at any given moment are only known with certainty for full-service cases, it is difficult to 
trust the findings seen on the arrears measure.  With child support collections improving, it makes 
no sense that arrears would also increase unless this were due to the bias in the measure.  Longer-
term, the findings of increased arrears had disappeared, suggesting perhaps that the artifact due to 
the bias had finally been overcome by increasing real-world (but unseen) arrears in the comparison 
 
65 
group.  The inclusion of money judgments was meant to measure this phenomenon longer-term in a 
more unbiased way, but such judgments were simply too infrequent for any trend to be detected.  
Finally, the alternative analysis of arrears made a convincing case that implementation of ICSS leads 
more cases to be opened nearer in time to the establishment of child support orders, and that in the 
long run such cases have historically led to far lower arrears balances.  This strongly suggests that 
ICSS would be found to lead directly to reduced arrears, should the cases be followed long enough.   
The opt-in and opt-out analyses actually tell a similar story from opposite sides of the coin.  
The opt-in analysis looked at counties prior to implementation in order to characterize those who 
voluntarily sought full service enforcement of their child support cases.  And the opt-out analysis 
gave a picture of those who voluntarily chose not to receive such services.  Generally speaking, 
those cases opting-in are more likely to have female NCPs, more likely to be older, more likely to be 
employed but at lower average wages.  In contrast, those cases opting-out are more likely to have 
male NCPs, more likely to be younger, less likely to be employed but at higher earnings.  Thus, those 
opting-in are in many aspects the opposite of those opting-out, and they paint a clear picture of 
those who think formal child support enforcement is good and useful versus those who do not.  
To the extent that ICSS impacts were reported to be different for subgroups such as 
Hispanics or members of the military, the tendency is toward the program working better for such 
groups, for the most part.  In areas whose child support caseloads contain more members of the 
military, the impacts on ICSS were toward better collection of child support, lesser arrears and 
money judgments, lesser reliance on public assistance, and better employment and earnings 
outcomes.  Areas with higher concentrations of Hispanics showed similar patterns on all of these, 
with the exception of child support, which was less likely to be collected but in higher amounts on 
average.  Since apparent arrears accumulation was less likely in higher Hispanic areas, it is difficult to 
interpret the child support finding.  However, on the whole it is clear that ICSS implementation is 
not hurting these subgroups, and in many ways it appears to be helping. 
Considering all these results together, it is clear that members of the IV-D caseload under a 
system of deemed applications and default enrollment will be slightly but not dramatically more 
affluent, but that the positive effects of ICSS also extend beyond the impact of this shift.  Making 
enrollment in IV-D services the default tends to bring in more cases, and in some ways these cases 
are slightly more affluent.  Some of these new cases could be regarded as “on the bubble” in terms 
of the likelihood that they will benefit from enhanced, pro-active child support enforcement.  Some 
of the most affluent among these cases then subsequently opt-out, with the belief that they don’t 
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need the assistance in collecting child support, or that they need the assistance less than others 
might.  What remains among the newly recruited cases, then, is some fraction who weren’t sure 
whether they would benefit from IV-D enforcement or weren’t aware of its existence or value.  And 
these could be exactly the groups that benefit most from a shift in the policy toward ‘deemed 
applications.’  They may not be poor now, but the assistance they receive enforcing child support 
obligations could be the very thing that keeps them from becoming poor when the next economic 
shock hits. 
The effects of ICSS on the caseload are clear.  Better child support outcomes, strong 
evidence of reduced arrears, and reduced public assistance all testify to the importance of enforcing 
child support cases early.  The ‘nudge’ toward the IV-D system that ICSS represents appears to help 





APPENDIX A:  DATA PROCESSING 
El Paso County 
Random Assignment 
Implementation of ICSS in El Paso, including random assignment of cases to the ICSS and 
control groups, began in March of 2013 and ended in May 2014.  A total of 1,175 unique records 
with random assignment designations were received from the El Paso DRO (see Table A-1).   
Table A-1. Random Assignment by El Paso DRO 
Case Type N (%) 
Cases identified for potential inclusion in the Control Group 565 (48%) 
Cases identified for potential inclusion in the Treatment Group 610 (52%) 
Total 1,175  
 
Study Population 
The El Paso DRO data included both cause-numbers and case-ids.  Using both variables to 
match to the OAG administrative data ensures a one-to-one match.  Case-ids were available for 97% 
of the randomly assigned cases, and these 1135 cases were matched to the OAG datasets using both 
cause number and case-id.  The remaining 40 cases without case-id were matched to the OAG 
datasets using only cause-number.  The two sets of matches were then combined.  A total of 1,122 
matches (95%) were obtained. These 1,122 cases form our study population. A close examination 
indicates similar match rates for the treatment group and the control group. Also, the match rate is 
fairly steady across the time period within which cases were assigned (March 2013 – May 2014). 
Table A-2. Matches with OAG Administrative Data 
Record Type Not Matched Matched Total 
El Paso DRO records with case-id 
17 1,118 1,135 
(2%) (99%) 97% 
El Paso DRO records without case-id 
36 4 40 
(90%) (10%) 3% 
Total 
53 1,122 1,175 




The study cases were matched to other OAG administrative datasets (court order data, case 
data, member-to-case cross-reference, and individual demographic data) to obtain additional 
information about the cases.  Only 58% of the study cases could be matched to the OAG court order 
dataset.  Nearly all (91%) of the study cases were matched to the OAG case dataset.  Using the case-
id to member-id cross-reference, custodial parents (CPs), non-custodial parents (NCPs) and 
dependent children were identified for each case, and their demographic information was obtained.  
Figure A-1 provides an overview of the matching process described above. Our final study 
population thus consisted of 1,119 cases.  Table A-3 summarizes cases potentially eligible for 
random assignment and inclusion in the final study adult population.  Note, however, that these 
cases were subjected to additional screens prior to inclusion in the study, as described in the 
Experimental Design section of the main body of the report. 
Table A-3. Cases Potentially Eligible for Random Assignment in El Paso Study Adult Population 
Study Adults CPs NCPs Total 
Cases identified for potential inclusion in the Control Group 
538 538 1,076 
(48%) (48%) (48%) 
Cases identified for potential inclusion in the Treatment Group 
581 581 1,162 
(52%) (52%) (52%) 
Total 1,119 1,119 2,238 
 
Employment and Benefit History 
Using social security numbers to match against other datasets, employment and benefit 
(SNAP and TANF) history were obtained for 97% of study adults (n=2168).  Social security numbers 
were not available for 3% of study adults (n=70), and thus for these individuals, employment, 
earnings and benefit history were treated as missing data (they are omitted from such analyses).   
Employment history was derived from quarterly Unemployment Insurance (UI) earnings 
records.  Derived measures included whether the adult was employed in the quarter during which 
the case was opened, the percent of time that the adult was employed in the prior 8 quarters, the 
adult’s average quarterly earnings in the prior 8 quarters, and whether or not the earnings history 
would have been sufficient for the adult to qualify for unemployment insurance if they had lost their 
job and met other criteria.  Benefit history indicators included whether the adult was receiving 
benefits during the month in which the case was opened, as well as the percent of time the adult 





Dependents were identified for the study cases and then matched to the available Medicaid 
and TANF data to determine if they had been enrolled in Medicaid or receiving TANF benefits prior 
to the date on which the case was opened (see Table A-4).  Enrollment in these programs would 
have made their cases ineligible for study because they should have been referred for enforcement 
as full-service (FS) IV-D cases. 
Table A-4. Medicaid/TANF History for Any Child 
 No Yes Total 
Cases with any child on Medicaid at case opening 
923 196 1119 
(82%) (18%)  
Cases with any child on TANF at case opening 
1115 4 1119 












1,053 study case 
(538 “e” & 581“c”) 
53 unmatched 
Match to OAG Cause 
Match to OAG Order 
(58% match rate”) 
Match to OAG Case 
(91% match rate) 
Match to OAG Member 
(100% match rate) 
Match to OAG Demo 





The OAG administrative cause data has 562,566 cases that were opened in Harris County 
(see Table A-5).  We restricted the data to the nine courts for the study (524,320 cases). These cases 
were then matched to other OAG administrative datasets (court order data, case data, member-to-
case cross-reference, and individual demographic data) to obtain additional information about the 
cases.  Nearly half of the records (40%) could not be matched to the OAG court order dataset.  
Nearly half of the records (43%) could also not be matched to the OAG case dataset.   




0 22701 4% 
22 1 0% 
55 846 0% 
133 1 0% 
151 1 0% 
176 1 0% 
215 1 0% 
245 58931 10% 
246 58350 10% 
247 58448 10% 
256 1 0% 
257 58410 10% 
308 58533 10% 
309 58643 10% 
310 57646 10% 
311 57463 10% 
312 57896 10% 
313 4847 1% 
314 4858 1% 
315 4690 1% 
351 1 0% 
398 1 0% 
507 296 0% 
Total 562,566  
The order-effective date was used as the entry date for study cases. Records that were 
missing the order-effective date were substituted with the cause-start-date from the OAG cause 
dataset.  Records that were missing both the order-entered-date and the cause-start-date were 
substituted with the case-open-date from the OAG case dataset.   After making these substitutions, 
we found that 76,310 cases (15%) did not have an entry date and were thus excluded from analysis.  
Treatment Assignment 
The cases in the study population were designated as “treatment” or “comparison” based 
on the entry date and the ICSS adoption date of the court to which they were assigned.  Cases with 
an entry date (a) in the month that the assigned court flipped, or (b) in the two months prior to the 
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month that the assigned court flipped, or (c) in the nine months after the month that the assigned 
court flipped, were excluded from analysis.  We eliminated cases from around the time of ICSS 
implementation to allow a period for case workers to get used to the new policies, procedures, and 
enforcement tools associated with ICSS.  New cases starting from a full year prior to this interval 
were kept for analysis and designated as the comparison group while new cases from a full year 
after this interval were kept for analysis and designated as the treatment group (see Table A-6).  





Comparison Excluded Treatment 
308th 2004 Sep 2003 Jul - 2004 Jun 2004 Jul - 2005 Jun 2005 Jul - 2006 Jun 
309th 2004 Sep 2003 Jul - 2004 Jun 2004 Jul - 2005 Jun 2005 Jul - 2006 Jun 
311th 2004 Sep 2003 Jul - 2004 Jun 2004 Jul - 2005 Jun 2005 Jul - 2006 Jun 
246th 2005 Jul 2004 May - 2005 Apr 2005 May -2006 Apr 2006 May - 2007 Apr 
312th 2005 Aug 2004 Jun - 2005 May 2005 Jun - 2006 May 2006 Jun - 2007 May 
257th 2006 Feb 2004 Dec - 2005 Nov 2005 Dec -2006 Nov 2006 Dec - 2007 Nov 
310th 2011 Mar 2010 Jan - 2010 Dec 2011 Jan - 2011 Dec 2012 Jan - 2012 Dec 
245th 2011 Sep 2010 Jul - 2011 Jun 2011 Jul - 2012 Jun 2012 Jul - 2013 Jun 
247th 2012 May 2011 Mar - 2012 Feb 2012 Mar - 2013 Feb 2013 Mar - 2014 Feb 
 
The Harris County study population was then comprised of a total of 43,657 cases. Using the 
case-id to member-id cross-reference, custodial parents (CPs), non-custodial parents (NCPs) and 
dependent children were identified for each case, and their demographic information was obtained. 
Figure A-2 provides an overview of the process used to create the Harris County study population. 
Our final study population thus consisted of 41,112 cases.  
Employment and Benefit History 
Using social security numbers to match against other databases, employment and benefit 
(SNAP and TANF) history were obtained for 94% of the study adults (n=77,205).  Social security 
numbers could not be found for 6% of the study adults (n=5,019), and thus for these individuals, 
employment, earnings and benefit history were treated as missing data.  Employment history, 
derived from UI records, included measures of whether the adult had been employed during the 
quarter in which the case was opened, the percent of time that the adult was employed in the prior 
8 quarters, the adult’s average quarterly earnings in the prior 8 quarters, and whether the earnings 
history would have been sufficient for the adult to qualify for unemployment insurance if they had 
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lost their job and met other criteria.  Benefit history included whether the adult was receiving 
benefits during the month in which the case was opened, as well as the percent of time the adult 
was eligible or received benefits during the prior 12 months. 
Medicaid / TANF History 
Dependents were identified for the study cases and then matched to the available Medicaid 
and TANF data to determine if they had been enrolled in Medicaid or receiving TANF benefits during 
the month in which the case was opened (see Table A-7).  These characteristics would have made 
their cases ineligible for study because they should have been referred for enforcement as full-
service (FS) IV-D cases. 
Table A-7. Medicaid/TANF History for Any Child 
 No Yes Total 
Cases with any child on Medicaid at case opening 
27,677 13,435 41,112 
67% 33%  
Cases with any child on TANF at case opening 
39,151 1,961 41,112 
95% 5%  
 
Note that due to limitations in the historical coverage of OAG administrative data, which 
was available and complete starting in January 2004, it was necessary at the time of analysis to 
exclude 6 months’ worth of new cases from the ICSS group for the three courts that converted in 
September 2004, in order to match the 6-month interval for accumulating new cases in the 
comparison group for these 3 courts. 
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Figure A-2. Processing of OAG Data to Build Study Population for Harris County 




meeting study criteria 
cases 
3,931,950 cases 
In OAG CAUS 
 
Subset to Harris County 
Match to OAG Order 
(60% match rate) 
Match to OAG Case 
(57% match rate) 
Match to OAG Member 
(100% match rate) 
Match to OAG Demo 
(99% match rate) 
41,112 study cases: 
20,859 “e”, 20,253 “c” 
562,566 cases 
From Harris County 
  
Subset to courts of interest 
Group based on entry date 
76,310 (15%) cases 
missing entry date 
381,995  (73%) cases with entry 
date before/after study period 
43,657 study cases: 
22,230 “e”, 21,427 “c” 
22,358 (6%) cases with entry 
date in court flip interval 
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Other ICSS Counties 
Study Population 
The OAG administrative cause data has 801,655 cases that were opened in the thirteen 
counties that we examine in our “Other ICSS Counties” analysis (see Table A-8).  These 776,057 
cases were then matched to other OAG administrative datasets (court order data, case data, 
member-to-case cross-reference, and individual demographic data) to obtain additional information 
about the cases.  About a third of the records (33%) could not be matched to the OAG court order 
dataset.  Nearly half of the records (46%) could also not be matched to the OAG case dataset.  
Table A-8. Other ICSS Counties Cases by County 
County Name N % 
Cameron 66622 8% 
Dallas 313314 39% 
Ector 31134 4% 
Gregg 24542 3% 
Harrison 10400 1% 
Hidalgo 90128 11% 
Lubbock 51351 6% 
Panola 3622 0% 
Smith 35216 4% 
Taylor 25576 3% 
Travis 111284 14% 
Upshur 5584 1% 




The order-effective date was used as the entry date for study cases. Records that were 
missing the order-effective date were substituted with the cause-start-date from the OAG cause 
dataset.  Records that were missing both the order-entered-date and the cause-start-date were 
substituted with the case-open-date from the OAG case dataset.   After making these substitutions, 







The cases in the study population were designated as “treatment” or “comparison” based 
on the date they were opened and the date that the county in which they were opened adopted 
ICSS, similar to what was done with Harris County cases.  For each county, cases with an entry date 
(a) in the month that the county flipped, or (b) in the two months prior to the months that the 
county flipped, or (c) in the nine months after the month that the county flipped, were excluded 
from analysis. New cases opened from a full year prior to this interval were kept for analysis as the 
comparison group and cases from a full year after this interval were kept for analysis as the 
treatment group (see Table A-9).  
Table A-9. Treatment Assignment in the Other ICSS Counties Study Population  
ICSS County Start date Comparison Excluded Treatment 
Harrison 2005 May 2004 Mar - 2005 Feb 2005 Mar - 2006 Feb 2006 Mar - 2007 Feb 
Cameron 2005 Aug 2004 Jun - 2005 May 2005 Jun - 2006 May 2006 Jun - 2007 May 
Gregg 2005 Sep 2004 Jul - 2005 Jun 2005 Jul - 2006 Jun 2006 Jul - 2007 Jun 
Panola 2005 Sep 2004 Jul - 2005 Jun 2005 Jul - 2006 Jun 2006 Jul - 2007 Jun 
Smith 2005 Sep 2004 Jul - 2005 Jun 2005 Jul - 2006 Jun 2006 Jul - 2007 Jun 
Upshur 2005 Sep 2004 Jul - 2005 Jun 2005 Jul - 2006 Jun 2006 Jul - 2007 Jun 
Dallas 2005 Oct 2004 Aug - 2005 Jul 2005 Aug - 2006 Jul 2006 Aug - 2007 Jul 
Taylor 2005 Nov 2004 Sep - 2005 Aug 2005 Sep - 2006 Aug 2006 Sep - 2007 Aug 
Hidalgo 2006 Feb 2004 Dec - 2005 Nov 2005 Dec -2006 Nov 2006 Dec - 2007 Nov 
Ector 2006 May 2005 Mar - 2006 Feb 2006 Mar - 2007 Feb 2007 Mar - 2008 Feb 
Webb 2006 Oct 2005 Aug - 2008 Jul 2006 Aug - 2007 Jul 2007 Aug - 2008 Jul 
Lubbock 2009 May 2008 Mar - 2009 Feb 2009 Mar - 2010 Feb 2010 Mar - 2011 Feb 
Travis 2009 July 2008 May - 2009 Apr 2009 May -2010 Apr 2010 May - 2011 Apr 
 
The study population was then comprised of a total of 70,674 cases. Using the case-id to 
member-id cross-reference, custodial parents (CPs), non-custodial parents (NCPs) and dependent 
children were identified for each case, and their demographic information was obtained.  Figure A-3 
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provides an overview of the process used to create the Other ICSS Counties study population. Our 
final study population thus consisted of 66,650 cases.  
Employment and Benefit History 
Using social security numbers to match against other databases, employment and benefit 
(SNAP and TANF) history were obtained for 93% of study adults (n=123,381).  Social security 
numbers could not be found for 7% of study adults (n=9,915), and thus for these individuals, 
employment, earnings and benefit history were treated as missing data.  Employment history, 
derived from UI records, included measures of whether the adult had been employed during the 
quarter in which the case was opened, the percent of time that the adult was employed in the prior 
8 quarters, the adult’s average quarterly earnings in the prior 8 quarters, and whether the earnings 
history would have been sufficient for the adult to qualify for unemployment insurance if they had 
lost their job and met other criteria.  Benefit history included whether the adult was receiving 
benefits during the month in which the case was opened, as well as the percent of time the adult 
was eligible or received benefits during the prior 12 months. 
Medicaid / TANF History 
Dependents were identified for the study cases and then matched to the available Medicaid 
and TANF data to determine if they had been enrolled in Medicaid or receiving TANF benefits during 
the month in which the case was opened (see Table A-10).  These characteristics would have made 
their cases ineligible for study because they should have been referred for enforcement as full-
service (FS) IV-D cases. 
Table A-10. Medicaid/TANF History for Any Child 
 No Yes Total 
Cases with any child on Medicaid at case opening 
44,480 22,170 66,650 
67% 33%  
Cases with any child on TANF at case opening 
62,696 3,954 66,650 
94% 6%  
 
Note that due to limitations in the historical coverage of OAG administrative data, we had to 
exclude Bexar, Wichita, Tarrant, and Midland Counties because their conversion to ICSS preceded 
the data coverage window, or because there was insufficient coverage of the pre-ICSS window to 








In OAG CAUS 
 
Subset to Other ICSS Counties 
Match to OAG Order 
(67% match rate) 
Match to OAG Case 
(54% match rate) 
Match to OAG Member 
(100% match rate) 
Match to OAG Demo 
(98% match rate) 
66,650 study cases: 
33,220 “e”, 33,430 “c” 
 
801,655 cases from 
Other ICSS Counties 
  
Group based on entry date 
83,943 cases (10%) 
missing entry date 
611,563 (76%) cases with entry 
date before/after study period 
70,674 study cases: 
35,193 “e”, 35,481 “c” 
35,475 (4%) cases with entry 




In order to study the impact of ICSS on the Other ICSS Counties, it was desirable to first 
identify suitable comparison counties that were as similar as possible to the ICSS counties, but that 
were not implementing ICSS at the time.  Note that this definition allows cases from some counties 
that would later convert to ICSS, like Travis or El Paso, for example, to serve as comparisons for 
counties that switched earlier, provided there was enough of a time differential.  A number of 
diverse county-year level characteristics (see Table A-11) were compiled for all counties in the state 
of Texas for each year of our study period using data from the OAG administrative datasets, the 
2010 U.S. Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment Statistics. 
Table A-11. County-level characteristics used for PSM 
Total population (2010) 
% population living in urban areas (2010) 
% population living in rural areas (2010) 
% high school graduate or higher (2014) 
% bachelor's degree or higher (2014) 
Per capita income in the past 12 months (2014) 
Median household income in the past 12 
months (2014) 
% population who are veterans (2014) 
% children in single parent households (2014) 
% single parent households (2010) 
% population who are never married (2014) 
Fertility Rate (2014)   
% population who are citizens (2014) 
Unemployment Rate 
Metro designation 
NCHS urban-rural designation (2006) 
Border counties 
Counties sharing a physical border with Mexico 
Counties with a military base 
% population in active military (2009) 
OAG case openings 
% OAG case openings with a female CP 
% OAG case openings with a Hispanic CP 
% OAG case openings with a black CP 
% OAG case openings with a race unknown CP 
% OAG case openings with a female NCP 
% OAG case openings with a Hispanic NCP 
% OAG case openings with a black NCP 
% OAG case openings with a race unknown NCP 
% OAG case openings with a military NCP 
Mean age of CP in OAG case openings 
Mean age of NCP in OAG case openings 
Median age of CP in OAG case openings 
Median age of NCP in OAG case openings 
 
 Propensity score matching methods were then used to match on these characteristics and 
identify the three most similar comparison counties for each county in the “Other ICSS” analysis (see 
Table A-12).  Once the comparison counties were chosen, a weighting scheme was devised so that 1) the 
county most similar to the target county in the Other ICSS analysis carried the greatest weight, and the 
 
A-80 
third most similar carried the least weight, and 2) the cases from the three comparison counties 
combined would carry the same weight as the target county.   




































































For each selected comparison county, cases with an entry date (a) in the month that the 
reference “other ICSS” county flipped, or (b) in the two months prior to the month that the 
reference county flipped, or (c) in the nine months after the month that the reference county 
flipped, were excluded from analysis. Cases from a full year prior to this interval and cases from a 
full year after this interval were kept for analysis.  We refer to these simply as Pre and Post, as there 
was no concurrent ICSS implementation at these sites.   
 
A-81 
OAG administrative data as well as employment and benefits data were extracted for these 
comparison county cases in a manner identical to that described earlier for Harris county and the 






APPENDIX B:  DETAILED STATISTICS 
This Appendix includes more detailed versions of several tables that appear in the main body of this report, including results of statistical 
tests.  In some tables, too few cases received TANF to allow TANF outcomes to be computed.  In addition, unconditional means were computed 
for some measures but no statistical tests were done. 
Table B-1. El Paso Treatment vs. Control Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members, Detailed 
  
ICSS Treatment 
group Control group         
All cases, demographics N=376 N=367         
  Mean Std Mean Std   t-value df prob 
NCP age (years) 37.0 8.383 36.9 9.097   -0.02 733 0.987 
NCP is female 6.2% 0.241 6.5% 0.248   0.22 739 0.828 
NCP is Hispanic 19.9% 0.400 23.7% 0.426   1.24 741 0.215 
NCP is black 3.2% 0.176 2.5% 0.155   -0.61 733 0.543 
NCP race/ethnicity unknown 69.9% 0.5 62.1% 0.5 * -2.26 741 0.024 
NCP is current or former military 28.2% 0.451             
CP age (years) 35.1 8.03 35.1 8.48   0.01 734 0.990 
CP is Hispanic 21.8% 0.414 25.9% 0.439   1.30 741 0.193 
CP is black 1.6% 0.125 1.6% 0.127   0.04 741 0.966 
CP race/ethnicity unknown 68.6% 0.465 63.2% 0.483   -1.55 741 0.121 
CP is current or former military 2.4% 0.153             
Number of children 1.6 0.775 1.6 0.791   -0.02 741 0.981 
Age of youngest child, years 7.2 5.043 7.2 4.846   -0.05 741 0.959 
Age of oldest child, years 9.1 5.530 9.0 5.578   -0.10 741 0.918 
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history                 
NCP employed at case opening 40.4% 0.491 40.6% 0.492   0.05 741 0.962 
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters 41.4% 0.450 38.4% 0.453   -0.92 741 0.359 
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $6,170 10863.3 $5,603 9230.3   -0.77 727 0.443 
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 






group Control group         
All cases, demographics N=376 N=367         
  Mean Std Mean Std   t-value df prob 
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters) 22.2 17.85 20.5 18.06   -1.26 741 0.206 
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 41.2% 0.493 39.0% 0.488   -0.63 741 0.531 
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year 4.3% 0.2 2.7% 0.2   -1.14 716 0.256 
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 2.4% 0.153 2.7% 0.163   0.29 741 0.775 
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year 3.2% 0.14 3.0% 0.14   -0.24 741 0.814 
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.3% 0.052 0.3% 0.052   0.02 741 0.986 
Percent of time NCP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.1% 0.017 0.3% 0.052   0.64 443 0.522 
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 1.2% 0.102 0.9% 0.089   -0.41 731 0.681 
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history                 
CP employed at case opening 53.2% 0.500 52.3% 0.500   -0.24 741 0.811 
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters 48.1% 0.449 48.3% 0.454   0.06 741 0.954 
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $4,952 6044.4 $5,381 8966.5   0.76 640 0.446 
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 14.6% 0.354 12.5% 0.332   -0.83 741 0.406 
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters) 22.1 17.29 22.1 17.10   0.03 741 0.975 
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 48.4% 0.500 48.2% 0.500   -0.05 741 0.962 
CP filed for unemployment within prior year 2.9% 0.2 2.5% 0.2   -0.40 741 0.691 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 11.2% 0.315 10.1% 0.302   -0.48 741 0.631 
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year 8.7% 0.22 10.3% 0.24   0.96 741 0.338 
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.0% 0.000 0.0% 0.000         
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.0% 0.000 0.0% 0.000         





Table B-2. Harris Treatment vs. Comparison Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members, Detailed 
  
ICSS Treatment 
group Comparison group         
All cases, demographics N=9,814 N=9,532         
  Mean Std Mean Std   t-value df prob 
NCP age (years) 34.6 8.859 34.5 8.734   -0.85 18705 0.397 
NCP is female 11.6% 0.320 11.2% 0.315   -0.82 19238 0.411 
NCP is Hispanic 26.1% 0.439 24.8% 0.432 * -2.12 19338 0.034 
NCP is black 29.0% 0.454 30.5% 0.460 * 2.26 19338 0.024 
NCP race/ethnicity unknown 23.0% 0.4 22.9% 0.4   -0.19 19338 0.851 
NCP is current or former military 3.1% 0.172             
CP age (years) 33.3 9.06 33.0 8.80   -1.90 18583 0.058 
CP is Hispanic 26.0% 0.439 24.3% 0.429 ** -2.67 19334 0.008 
CP is black 25.2% 0.434 26.3% 0.440   1.73 19335 0.083 
CP race/ethnicity unknown 27.4% 0.446 28.0% 0.449   0.96 19335 0.338 
CP is current or former military 0.5% 0.070             
Number of children 1.4 0.711 1.4 0.766 ** -3.77 19131 0.000 
Age of youngest child, years 6.1 4.976 6.3 5.038 ** 3.63 18964 0.000 
Age of oldest child, years 7.3 5.499 7.6 5.492 ** 2.92 18964 0.004 
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history                 
NCP employed at case opening 61.2% 0.487 58.4% 0.493 ** -4.05 19338 <.0001 
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters 59.3% 0.425 57.9% 0.424 * -2.34 19338 0.019 
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $7,687 16425.4 $6,857 18928.1 ** -3.25 18793 0.001 
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 23.7% 0.425 27.2% 0.445 ** 5.50 19231 <.0001 
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters) 28.7 14.66 28.6 14.69   -0.13 19338 0.893 
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 58.9% 0.492 56.5% 0.496 ** -3.38 19338 0.001 
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year 6.7% 0.3 9.1% 0.3 ** 6.22 18800 <.0001 
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 4.3% 0.202 3.9% 0.194   -1.20 19336 0.228 
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year 5.0% 0.17 4.2% 0.16 ** -3.30 19273 0.001 
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.2% 0.039 0.1% 0.027   -1.65 17518 0.100 






group Comparison group         
All cases, demographics N=9,814 N=9,532         
  Mean Std Mean Std   t-value df prob 
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 3.0% 0.143 3.6% 0.149 * 2.57 19240 0.010 
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history                 
CP employed at case opening 64.9% 0.477 60.7% 0.488 ** -5.99 19285 <.0001 
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters 61.1% 0.423 58.1% 0.433 ** -4.85 19286 <.0001 
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $5,695 7554.1 $5,233 7831.6 ** -4.17 19255 <.0001 
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 20.4% 0.403 21.4% 0.410   1.79 19335 0.074 
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters) 27.5 15.18 26.7 15.69 ** -3.71 19263 0.000 
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 61.3% 0.487 57.5% 0.494 ** -5.45 19335 <.0001 
CP filed for unemployment within prior year 5.6% 0.2 6.7% 0.2 ** 3.08 19107 0.002 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 14.2% 0.349 12.8% 0.334 ** -2.87 19330 0.004 
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year 14.3% 0.29 12.1% 0.27 ** -5.58 19306 <.0001 
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.0% 0.017 0.0% 0.000   -1.73 9804 0.083 
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.8% 0.060 1.7% 0.093 ** 7.88 16284 <.0001 





Table B-3. Other ICSS Counties Treatment vs. Comparison Group, all Identified Non-PA Case Members, Detailed 
  
ICSS Treatment 
group Comparison group         
All cases, demographics N=16,964 N=19,020         
  Mean Std Mean Std   t-value df prob 
NCP age (years) 34.3 8.903 33.4 8.688 ** -9.70 33546 <.0001 
NCP is female 13.2% 0.338 12.4% 0.329 * -2.26 35151 0.024 
NCP is Hispanic 35.1% 0.477 34.3% 0.475   -1.41 35976 0.159 
NCP is black 22.1% 0.415 24.0% 0.427 ** 4.31 35714 <.0001 
NCP race/ethnicity unknown 15.9% 0.4 19.5% 0.4 ** 9.01 35935 <.0001 
NCP is current or former military 3.7% 0.188             
CP age (years) 33.4 9.34 32.2 9.05 ** -12.30 32826 <.0001 
CP is Hispanic 34.2% 0.474 33.8% 0.473   -0.75 35977 0.452 
CP is black 18.7% 0.390 20.7% 0.405 ** 4.70 35768 <.0001 
CP race/ethnicity unknown 20.0% 0.400 23.2% 0.422 ** 7.42 35848 <.0001 
CP is current or former military 0.7% 0.083             
Number of children 1.4 0.739 1.4 0.795 ** -6.33 35915 <.0001 
Age of youngest child, years 6.4 5.239 6.2 5.235 ** -3.27 34879 0.001 
Age of oldest child, years 7.7 5.641 7.5 5.740 ** -3.13 34767 0.002 
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history                 
NCP employed at case opening 59.4% 0.491 55.9% 0.497 ** -6.77 35976 <.0001 
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters 57.9% 0.423 55.4% 0.424 ** -5.78 35976 <.0001 
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $6,301 11822.1 $5,491 12029.4 ** -6.44 35638 <.0001 
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 26.2% 0.440 27.4% 0.446 * 2.51 35976 0.012 
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters) 28.9 14.78 28.4 14.99 ** -2.82 35976 0.005 
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 57.1% 0.495 53.9% 0.498 ** -6.12 35976 <.0001 
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year 6.2% 0.2 6.7% 0.2   1.71 35731 0.087 
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 5.3% 0.223 7.3% 0.260 ** 7.96 35926 <.0001 
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year 7.0% 0.21 7.4% 0.21   1.41 35727 0.158 
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.1% 0.038 0.1% 0.036   -0.40 34945 0.692 






group Comparison group         
All cases, demographics N=16,964 N=19,020         
  Mean Std Mean Std   t-value df prob 
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 4.9% 0.174 4.1% 0.158 ** -4.74 34436 <.0001 
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history                 
CP employed at case opening 62.9% 0.483 60.0% 0.490 ** -5.71 35977 <.0001 
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters 59.7% 0.431 57.6% 0.430 ** -4.67 35977 <.0001 
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $4,947 6280.1 $4,327 5792.1 ** -9.70 34667 <.0001 
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 19.9% 0.399 21.8% 0.413 ** 4.60 35752 <.0001 
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters) 27.2 15.76 26.6 15.82 ** -3.18 35977 0.002 
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 59.9% 0.490 57.0% 0.495 ** -5.60 35977 <.0001 
CP filed for unemployment within prior year 4.9% 0.2 5.8% 0.2 ** 3.75 35932 0.000 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 13.1% 0.338 19.8% 0.399 ** 17.21 35883 <.0001 
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year 15.0% 0.30 18.3% 0.32 ** 10.06 35940 <.0001 
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.0% 0.022 0.1% 0.024   0.44 35972 0.658 
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.9% 0.067 1.4% 0.086 ** 6.42 35393 <.0001 





Table B-4. El Paso Impact Estimates, Full Sample, Detailed 









size ICSS Impact F-value prob 
Any FS child support collections made 62.7% 10632 11.9% 10207 50.8% ** 7893.32 <.0001 
Any RO child support collections made 1.2% 10632 39.6% 10207 -38.4% ** 6272.39 <.0001 
Any child support collections made, either type 63.8% 10632 51.4% 10207 12.4% ** 336.15 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $927 6785 $949 5243 -$22   1.96 0.1612 
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional $592   $487           
Regular child support payment due, monthly $653 10632 $161 10207 $492 ** 4702.36 <.0001 
Arrears child support payment due, monthly $11 10632 $5 10207 $6 ** 50.84 <.0001 
Money judgment made in child support case 0.2% 10632 0.2% 10207 0.0%   0.93 0.3347 
Any arrears owed 43.6% 883 9.8% 825 33.8% ** 288 <.0001 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $3533 385 $5025 81 -$1492   1.13 0.2891 
Total arrears, unconditional $1531 883 $503 825 $1028 ** 12.1 0.0005 
Total arrears owed to the state $10 883 $3 825 $7   2.57 0.1090 
Total arrears owed to the CP $1521 883 $500 825 $1021 ** 11.96 0.0006 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 7.6% 10632 8.4% 10207 -0.8%  * 4.52 0.0335 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, 
among those receiving benefits $257 809 $300 861 -$43 ** 19.17 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional $20   $25           
CP enrolled in Medicaid 3.4% 10632 4.8% 10207 -1.4% ** 26.4 <.0001 
CP employed 51.9% 2920 49.8% 2785 2.1%   2.48 0.1155 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $9393 1515 $10874 1388 -$1481 ** 29.29 <.0001 
NCP employed 41.6% 2920 39.1% 2785 2.5%  * 3.97 0.0464 
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed $16606 1216 $13654 1088 $2952 ** 6.69 0.0098 
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01.  Too few cases received TANF to allow TANF 




Table B-5. El Paso Impact Estimates, Late Assignments Only, Detailed 









size ICSS Impact F-value prob 
Any FS child support collections made 67.2% 4372 10.7% 4439 56.5% ** 4466.11 <.0001 
Any RO child support collections made 1.3% 4372 40.1% 4439 -38.8% ** 2595.3 <.0001 
Any child support collections made, either type 68.5% 4372 50.6% 4439 17.9% ** 299.39 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $882 2993 $973 2248 -$91 ** 21.64 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional $604   $493           
Regular child support payment due, monthly $682 4372 $151 4439 $531 ** 2840.73 <.0001 
Arrears child support payment due, monthly $16 4372 $4 4439 $12 ** 56.08 <.0001 
Money judgment made in child support case 0.2% 4372 0.2% 4439 0.0%   0.27 0.6053 
Any arrears owed 48.9% 311 9.9% 312 39.0% ** 138.6 <.0001 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $4543 152 $5052 31 -$509   0.02 0.8813 
Total arrears, unconditional $2195 311 $527 312 $1668  * 4.92 0.0269 
Total arrears owed to the state $5 311 $5 312 $   0.04 0.8379 
Total arrears owed to the CP $2191 311 $521 312 $1670  * 4.93 0.0267 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 5.7% 4372 8.3% 4439 -2.6% ** 23.4 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP $280 247 $336 368 -$56 ** 8.89 0.0030 
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional $16   $28           
CP enrolled in Medicaid 1.7% 4372 4.9% 4439 -3.2% ** 74.08 <.0001 
CP employed 51.3% 1156 53.0% 1168 -1.7%   0.65 0.4201 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $10467 593 $11172 619 -$705   2.25 0.1336 
NCP employed 41.9% 1156 40.1% 1168 1.8%   0.79 0.3735 
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed $14236 484 $15926 468 -$1690   2.2 0.1381 
Source:  RMC analysis of Texas OAG and HHSC administrative records and El Paso County DRO data.  *=p<.05; **=p<.01.  Too few cases received TANF to allow TANF 




Table B-6. Harris Short Term Quasi-experimental Impact Estimates, Detailed 












with ICSS F-value prob 
Any FS child support collections made 45.9% 92950 29.1% 115602 16.8% ** 6442.95 <.0001 
Any RO child support collections made 4.7% 92950 7.0% 115602 -2.3% ** 464.12 <.0001 
Any child support collections made, either type 50.4% 92950 35.9% 115602 14.5% ** 4553.76 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $661 46870 $599 41545 $62 ** 183.87 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional $333   $215           
Regular child support payment due, monthly $394 92950 $275 115602 $119 ** 4429.12 <.0001 
Arrears child support payment due, monthly $15 92950 $18 115602 -$3 ** 105.41 <.0001 
Money judgment made in child support case 0.3% 92950 0.3% 115602 0.0%   0.22 0.6355 
Any arrears owed 42.0% 3759 38.8% 2428 3.2%  * 6.63 0.0100 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $4339 1651 $5335 868 -$996  * 3.94 0.0473 
Total arrears, unconditional $1809 3759 $2057 2428 -$248   1.45 0.2283 
Total arrears owed to the state $50 3759 $68 2428 -$18   2.82 0.0934 
Total arrears owed to the CP $1759 3759 $1989 2428 -$230   1.26 0.2620 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 15.2% 92719 15.5% 115013 -0.3%   3.46 0.0630 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, 
among those receiving benefits $352 14080 $370 17806 -$18 ** 75.9 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional $53   $57           
CP receiving TANF benefits 1.0% 92719 1.5% 115013 -0.5% ** 89.11 <.0001 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 8.9% 92719 9.7% 115013 -.8% ** 35.81 <.0001 
CP employed 65.3% 25697 60.6% 32014 4.7% ** 131.9 <.0001 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $9348 16776 $8815 19413 $533 ** 23.59 <.0001 
NCP employed 60.3% 25725 56.5% 31985 3.8% ** 84.87 <.0001 





Table B-7. Other ICSS Counties, Quasi-experimental Impact Estimates, Detailed 
  ICSS group Comparison group         
Outcome 
Adjusted 
mean sample size 
Adjusted 
mean sample size 
Difference 
associated 
with ICSS F-value prob 
Any FS child support collections made 38.0% 1482609 28.9% 1746746 9.1% ** 29706 <.0001 
Any RO child support collections made 3.9% 1482609 8.0% 1746746 -4.1% ** 24144.1 <.0001 
Any child support collections made, either type 41.8% 1482609 36.9% 1746746 4.9% ** 8075.75 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $598 617402 $552 645650 $46 ** 1094.7 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional $249   $204           
Regular child support payment due, monthly $269 1482609 $186 1746746 $83 ** 48225.4 <.0001 
Arrears child support payment due, monthly $27 1482609 $27 1746746 $ ** 7.53 0.0061 
Money judgment made in child support case 0.3% 1482609 0.4% 1746746 -0.1%   1.88 0.1700 
Any arrears owed 40.5% 110703 38.6% 108856 1.9% ** 85.03 <.0001 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $9229 45181 $10150 41692 -$921 ** 88.08 <.0001 
Total arrears, unconditional $3768 110703 $3886 108856 -$118 ** 7.16 0.0075 
Total arrears owed to the state $193 110703 $380 108856 -$187 ** 530.05 <.0001 
Total arrears owed to the CP $3574 110703 $3506 108856 $68   2.61 0.1060 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 16.7% 1482239 19.9% 1744427 -3.2% ** 5408.24 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, 
among those receiving benefits $390 246676 $409 347598 -$19 ** 1052.65 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional $65   $81           
CP receiving TANF benefits 0.6% 1482239 0.9% 1744427 -0.3% ** 1373.22 <.0001 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 12.8% 1482239 14.5% 1744427 -1.7% ** 1832.79 <.0001 
CP employed 58.7% 471468 56.5% 568782 2.2% ** 517.17 <.0001 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $9353 276708 $8736 321453 $617 ** 620.65 <.0001 
NCP employed 52.3% 471446 49.9% 568829 2.4% ** 628.78 <.0001 





Table B-8. Other ICSS Counties, Quasi-experimental Impact Estimates, Difference-in-Differences Model 
  ICSS Counties Non-ICSS Counties         
Outcome 
Pre 
(comparison) Post (ICSS) Pre Post 
ICSS Impact 
(diff. in 
diff.) F-value prob 
Any FS child support collections made 29.0% 37.9% 26.0% 27.6% 7.3% ** 1174.2 <.0001 
Any RO child support collections made 8.0% 3.9% 10.9% 11.2% -4.4% ** 1254.26 <.0001 
Any child support collections made, either type 36.9% 41.8% 36.8% 38.7% 3.0% ** 167.93 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $552 $598 $569 $540 $75 ** 172.2 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional $204 $249 $214 $218         
Regular child support payment due, monthly $186 $269 $173 $172 $84 ** 3181.55 <.0001 
Arrears child support payment due, monthly $27 $27 $22 $23 -$1 ** 16.5 <.0001 
Money judgment made in child support case 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% -0.1%   3.66 0.0558 
Any arrears owed 38.4% 40.6% 34.8% 37.5% -0.5%   0.32 0.5729 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $10324 $9406 $8853 $8345 -$410   0.99 0.3202 
Total arrears, unconditional $3895 $3795 $3187 $3158 -$71   0.16 0.6888 
Total arrears owed to the state $377 $198 $347 $299 -$131 ** 15.51 <.0001 
Total arrears owed to the CP $3518 $3597 $2840 $2860 $59   0.12 0.7255 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 19.9% 16.7% 17.7% 19.7% -5.2% ** 646.63 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, 
among those receiving benefits $410 $391 $397 $381 -$3   2.45 0.1178 
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional $82 $65 $69 $73         
CP receiving TANF benefits 0.9% 0.6% 0.6% 0.8% -0.5% ** 163.7 <.0001 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 14.5% 12.8% 10.5% 12.7% -3.9% ** 480.49 <.0001 
CP employed 56.5% 58.7% 55.2% 55.5% 1.9% ** 17.07 <.0001 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $8,727 $9,345 $8,787 $8,216 $1,189 ** 95.68 <.0001 
NCP employed 49.9% 52.4% 49.9% 50.1% 2.3% ** 21.3 <.0001 




Table B-9. Differential ICSS Impacts among Hispanics, Difference-in-Differences Model, Detailed 
  Less Hispanic Counties More Hispanic Counties         
Outcome 
Pre 
(comparison) Post (ICSS) 
Pre 
(comparison) Post (ICSS) 
Hispanic 
Differential 
Impact (d.i.d.) F-value prob 
Any FS child support collections made 26.0% 37.4% 32.8% 38.9% -5.3% ** 2396.66 <.0001 
Any RO child support collections made 8.8% 3.9% 7.0% 3.8% 1.7% ** 840.36 <.0001 
Any child support collections made, either type 34.7% 41.3% 39.8% 42.7% -3.7% ** 1083.23 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $551 $578 $553 $634 $54 ** 361.47 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional $188 $236 $225 $274        
Regular child support payment due, monthly $180 $266 $193 $274 -$5 ** 53.12 <.0001 
Arrears child support payment due, monthly $23 $25 $31 $30 -$3 ** 372.31 <.0001 
Money judgment made in child support case 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% ** 48.97 <.0001 
Any arrears owed 35.3% 40.8% 41.9% 40.2% -7.2% ** 279.78 <.0001 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $10022 $8976 $10247 $9693 $492 * 5.81 0.0159 
Total arrears, unconditional $3503 $3690 $4270 $3931 -$526 ** 32.83 <.0001 
Total arrears owed to the state $195 $137 $565 $307 -$200 ** 143.42 <.0001 
Total arrears owed to the CP $3308 $3552 $3704 $3624 -$324 ** 13.69 0.0002 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 14.6% 15.8% 26.9% 18.3% -9.8% ** 12395.5 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, among 
those receiving benefits $379 $393 $430 $385 -$59 ** 2517.51 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional $55 $61 $117 $71        
CP receiving TANF benefits 0.9% 0.7% 0.9% 0.3% -0.4% ** 270.16 <.0001 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 11.0% 12.2% 19.0% 14.0% -6.2% ** 6206.87 <.0001 
CP employed 57.7% 59.5% 54.9% 57.2% .5% ** 8.21 0.0042 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $9,293 $9,458 $7,970 $9,150 $1,015 ** 393.4 <.0001 
NCP employed 50.4% 52.7% 49.2% 51.6% 0.1%  0.1 0.7553 




Table B-10. Differential ICSS Impacts among Military Members, Difference-in-Differences Model, Detailed 
  Less Military Counties More Military Counties         
Outcome 
Pre 
(comparison) Post (ICSS) 
Pre 
(comparison) Post (ICSS) 
Military 
Differential 
Impact (d.i.d.) F-value prob 
Any FS child support collections made 27.5% 36.9% 31.3% 41.7% 1.0% ** 81.3 <.0001 
Any RO child support collections made 8.2% 4.0% 8.1% 3.5% -0.4% ** 35.06 <.0001 
Any child support collections made, either type 35.7% 40.8% 39.4% 45.2% 0.7% ** 32.87 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $556 $585 $555 $645 $61 ** 415.41 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional $196 $236 $225 $297         
Regular child support payment due, monthly $191 $264 $176 $295 $46 ** 2893.36 <.0001 
Arrears child support payment due, monthly $24 $27 $31 $27 -$7 ** 1333.21 <.0001 
Money judgment made in child support case 0.3% 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% -0.1% ** 44.57 <.0001 
Any arrears owed 36.4% 41.3% 41.2% 38.6% -7.5% ** 273.31 <.0001 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $10020 $9192 $10248 $9202 -$218   1.03 0.3106 
Total arrears, unconditional $3639 $3828 $4173 $3536 -$826 ** 73.1 <.0001 
Total arrears owed to the state $222 $173 $597 $261 -$287 ** 263.86 <.0001 
Total arrears owed to the CP $3417 $3655 $3576 $3275 -$539 ** 34.07 <.0001 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 15.8% 16.7% 27.6% 16.3% -12.2% ** 16947.7 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, 
among those receiving benefits $386 $396 $433 $372 -$71 ** 3255.02 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional $60 $66 $121 $62         
CP receiving TANF benefits 0.9% 0.6% 1.0% 0.3% -0.4% ** 360.74 <.0001 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 12.2% 13.0% 18.7% 11.8% -7.7% ** 8398 <.0001 
CP employed 57.3% 58.6% 54.9% 58.8% 2.6% ** 150.28 <.0001 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $9,124 $9,368 $7,996 $9,313 $1,073 ** 387.53 <.0001 
NCP employed 50.7% 51.9% 48.1% 53.3% 4.0% ** 351.36 <.0001 




Table B-11. Opt-Outs vs. those Remaining in Full Service, All Sites, Detailed 
  Opted Out 
Remained Full 
Service         
All cases, demographics N=2,343 N=27,574         
  Mean Std Mean Std   t-value df prob 
NCP age (years) 36.9 9.553 34.3 9.267 ** -10.45 25119 <.0001 
NCP is female 27.1% 0.444 10.4% 0.305 ** -17.72 2519 <.0001 
NCP is Hispanic 13.1% 0.337 31.2% 0.463 ** 24.18 3148 <.0001 
NCP is black 5.3% 0.225 27.3% 0.446 ** 40.98 4128 <.0001 
NCP race/ethnicity unknown 64.8% 0.5 14.4% 0.4 ** -50.00 2561 <.0001 
NCP is current or former military 1.0% 0.099             
CP age (years) 37.9 9.62 32.9 9.49 ** -18.98 25103 <.0001 
CP is Hispanic 9.6% 0.295 31.0% 0.463 ** 32.00 3413 <.0001 
CP is black 3.6% 0.186 24.5% 0.430 ** 45.21 4872 <.0001 
CP race/ethnicity unknown 74.1% 0.438 16.2% 0.368 ** -62.24 2631 <.0001 
CP is current or former military 0.6% 0.077             
Number of children 1.0 0.866 1.2 0.810 ** 11.28 2702 <.0001 
Age of youngest child, years 8.2 5.716 6.1 5.416 ** -14.34 1882 <.0001 
Age of oldest child, years 9.5 5.918 7.3 5.992 ** -14.36 25477 <.0001 
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history                 
NCP employed at case opening 52.3% 0.500 59.7% 0.490 ** 7.02 29915 <.0001 
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters 51.7% 0.451 58.3% 0.419 ** 6.83 2697 <.0001 
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $8,053 25324.3 $6,554 13867.2 ** -2.83 2463 0.005 
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 20.4% 0.403 26.3% 0.440 ** 6.83 2840 <.0001 
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters) 25.7 17.16 28.3 14.72 ** 7.23 2643 <.0001 
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 50.4% 0.500 57.4% 0.494 ** 6.59 29915 <.0001 
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year 3.5% 0.2 6.6% 0.2 ** 7.56 3117 <.0001 
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 3.6% 0.186 4.6% 0.210 * 2.57 2874 0.010 
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year 5.4% 0.18 5.8% 0.19   1.11 29915 0.269 
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.3% 0.051 0.1% 0.036   -1.18 2549 0.239 




  Opted Out 
Remained Full 
Service         
All cases, demographics N=2,343 N=27,574         
  Mean Std Mean Std   t-value df prob 
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 5.1% 0.183 5.0% 0.177   -0.28 2728 0.779 
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history                 
CP employed at case opening 54.5% 0.498 64.0% 0.480 ** 8.88 2725 <.0001 
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters 51.9% 0.459 61.0% 0.416 ** 9.33 2680 <.0001 
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $5,978 8747.0 $5,039 6402.1 ** -5.08 2560 <.0001 
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 15.2% 0.359 24.2% 0.428 ** 11.55 2941 <.0001 
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters) 24.7 17.61 27.3 14.99 ** 6.93 2638 <.0001 
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 52.1% 0.500 60.7% 0.489 ** 8.11 29914 <.0001 
CP filed for unemployment within prior year 2.6% 0.2 5.8% 0.2 ** 9.00 3278 <.0001 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 4.7% 0.212 18.4% 0.388 ** 27.74 3844 <.0001 
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year 4.1% 0.16 18.8% 0.33 ** 37.90 4208 <.0001 
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.0% 0.021 1.1% 0.103 ** 13.65 16420 <.0001 
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year 0.1% 0.027 1.4% 0.087 ** 17.29 7588 <.0001 






Table B-12. Apparent Opt-Outs, El Paso, Outcomes Comparison, Detailed 
  Opted Out Remained Full Service         
Outcome 
Adjusted 
mean sample size 
Adjusted 
mean sample size 
Difference 
Associated 
with Opt-out F-value prob 
Any FS child support collections made 10.2% 578 66.3% 9560 -56.1% ** 794.38 <.0001 
Any RO child support collections made 14.7% 578 0.4% 9560 14.3% ** 1058.02 <.0001 
Any child support collections made, either type 24.7% 578 66.6% 9560 -41.9% ** 433.57 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $1210 143 $921 6368 $289 ** 19.29 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional $299   $613           
Regular child support payment due, monthly $503 578 $663 9560 -$160 ** 35.02 <.0001 
Arrears child support payment due, monthly $1 578 $11 9560 -$10 ** 11.08 0.0009 
Money judgment made in child support case 0.0% 578 0.2% 9560 -0.2%   1.39 0.2378 
Any arrears owed 7.3% 41 45.0% 803 -37.7% ** 23.09 <.0001 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $7686 3 $3467 361 $4219   0.34 0.5598 
Total arrears, unconditional $562 41 $1559 803 -$997   0.55 0.4569 
Total arrears owed to the state $ 41 $5 803 #VALUE!   0.39 0.5322 
Total arrears owed to the CP $562 41 $1554 803 -$992   0.55 0.4591 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 3.8% 578 7.2% 9560 -3.4% ** 9.49 0.0021 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, 
among those receiving benefits $336 22 $267 685 $69   3.34 0.0678 
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional $13   $19           
 CP receiving TANF benefits         
CP enrolled in Medicaid 6.7% 578 3.0% 9560 3.7% ** 24.2 <.0001 
CP employed 46.5% 159 51.0% 2628 -4.5%   1.21 0.2720 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $9403 74 $9387 1341 $16   0 0.9830 
NCP employed 20.8% 159 43.1% 2628 -22.3% ** 31.12 <.0001 





Table B-13. Apparent Opt-Outs, Harris, Outcomes Comparison, Detailed 
  Opted Out Remained Full Service         
Outcome 
Adjusted 
mean sample size 
Adjusted 
mean sample size 
Difference 
Associated 
with Opt-out F-value prob 
Any FS child support collections made 1.0% 8717 50.7% 75442 -49.7% ** 8594.21 <.0001 
Any RO child support collections made 30.5% 8717 2.1% 75442 28.4% ** 15512.4 <.0001 
Any child support collections made, either type 31.0% 8717 52.6% 75442 -21.6% ** 1494.69 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $860 2700 $662 39720 $198 ** 245.63 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional $266   $349           
Regular child support payment due, monthly $282 8717 $416 75442 -$134 ** 667.51 <.0001 
Arrears child support payment due, monthly $1 8717 $13 75442 -$12 ** 810 <.0001 
Money judgment made in child support case 0.0% 8717 0.3% 75442 -0.3% ** 23.75 <.0001 
Any arrears owed 4.5% 287 46.4% 3289 -41.9% ** 199.42 <.0001 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $1416 13 $3832 1527 -$2416   0.66 0.4181 
Total arrears, unconditional $64 287 $1779 3289 -$1715 ** 14.72 0.0001 
Total arrears owed to the state $0 287 $47 3289 $0 ** 12.97 0.0003 
Total arrears owed to the CP $64 287 $1732 3289 -$1668 ** 14.02 0.0002 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 2.7% 8717 15.8% 75254 -13.1% ** 1100.87 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, 
among those receiving benefits $335 237 $350 11923 -$15   1.61 0.2051 
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional $9   $55           
CP receiving TANF benefits 0.1% 8717 1.1% 75254 -1.0% ** 77.68 <.0001 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 1.7% 8717 9.2% 75254 -7.5% ** 570.4 <.0001 
CP employed 60.3% 2540 65.8% 20718 -5.5% ** 30.01 <.0001 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $13834 1532 $9150 13632 $4684 ** 211.85 <.0001 
NCP employed 49.8% 2540 62.0% 20736 -12.2% ** 141.8 <.0001 





Table B-14. Apparent Opt-Outs, Other ICSS Counties, Outcomes Comparison, Detailed 
  Opted Out Remained Full Service         
Outcome 
Adjusted 
mean sample size 
Adjusted 
mean sample size 
Difference 
Associated 
with Opt-out F-value prob 
Any FS child support collections made 0.4% 218786 45.5% 1055708 -45.1% ** 178933 <.0001 
Any RO child support collections made 18.8% 218786 1.3% 1055708 17.5% ** 152185 <.0001 
Any child support collections made, either type 19.1% 218786 46.6% 1055708 -27.5% ** 59092.7 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $703 41784 $606 492405 $97 ** 697.89 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional $134   $283           
Regular child support payment due, monthly $118 218786 $311 1055708 -$193 ** 38398.3 <.0001 
Arrears child support payment due, monthly $5 218786 $24 1055708 -$19 ** 14872.8 <.0001 
Money judgment made in child support case 0.0% 218786 0.4% 1055708 -0.4% ** 840.18 <.0001 
Any arrears owed 0.7% 16604 46.3% 78580 -45.6% ** 13784.9 <.0001 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $7866 118 $8212 36366 -$346   0.09 0.7585 
Total arrears, unconditional $56 16604 $3801 78580 -$3745 ** 2700.7 <.0001 
Total arrears owed to the state $ 16604 $137 78580 #VALUE! ** 496.31 <.0001 
Total arrears owed to the CP $56 16604 $3663 78580 -$3607 ** 2601.95 <.0001 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 5.3% 218783 18.3% 1055362 -13.0% ** 23091.5 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, 
among those receiving benefits $336 11628 $395 193240 -$59 ** 851.61 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional $18   $72           
CP receiving TANF benefits 0.1% 218783 0.7% 1055362 -0.6% ** 1198.9 <.0001 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 3.7% 218783 14.6% 1055362 -10.9% ** 19668.7 <.0001 
CP employed 50.7% 69774 60.8% 335571 -10.1% ** 2459.98 <.0001 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $12102 35394 $9161 204168 $2941 ** 2965.35 <.0001 
NCP employed 44.5% 69774 55.0% 335545 -10.5% ** 2555.53 <.0001 





Table B-15. Opt-Ins vs. Mandatory Full Service, Other ICSS Sites, Detailed 
  
Opted In to Full 
Service 
Mandatory Full 
Service         
All cases, demographics N=10,958 N=4,126         
  Mean Std Mean Std   t-value df prob 
NCP age (years) 32.1 8.562 36.4 9.195 ** 20.89 3441 <.0001 
NCP is female 12.0% 0.325 19.9% 0.399 ** 11.32 6256 <.0001 
NCP is Hispanic 39.6% 0.489 12.7% 0.333 ** -38.52 10844 <.0001 
NCP is black 25.7% 0.437 6.9% 0.253 ** -32.74 12597 <.0001 
NCP race/ethnicity unknown 7.4% 0.3 68.7% 0.5 ** 80.28 5148 <.0001 
NCP is current or former military 3.9% 0.193             
CP age (years) 31.1 9.17 35.7 9.11 ** 21.90 13222 <.0001 
CP is Hispanic 40.8% 0.492 9.7% 0.297 ** -47.20 12169 <.0001 
CP is black 22.7% 0.419 5.0% 0.217 ** -33.79 13665 <.0001 
CP race/ethnicity unknown 7.8% 0.268 76.4% 0.425 ** 96.72 5406 <.0001 
CP is current or former military 0.9% 0.096             
Number of children 1.4 0.716 1.2 0.907 ** -15.17 6160 <.0001 
Age of youngest child, years 5.0 4.798 7.7 5.290 ** 25.37 4872 <.0001 
Age of oldest child, years 6.2 5.405 9.2 5.612 ** 27.20 5094 <.0001 
Non-custodial Parent, employment and benefit history                 
NCP employed at case opening 57.9% 0.494 53.3% 0.499 ** -5.03 15082 <.0001 
Percent of time NCP employed over prior 8 quarters 57.6% 0.415 53.5% 0.451 ** -5.14 6917 <.0001 
NCP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $4,836 8313.0 $8,658 20886.0 ** 11.42 4626 <.0001 
NCP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 29.0% 0.454 20.1% 0.401 ** -11.70 8335 <.0001 
Time since first observed NCP earnings (quarters) 28.2 14.50 26.2 17.07 ** -6.83 6489 <.0001 
NCP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 56.1% 0.496 52.9% 0.499 ** -3.51 15082 0.001 
NCP filed for unemployment within prior year 7.3% 0.3 4.8% 0.2 ** -6.16 9004 <.0001 
NCP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 8.2% 0.275 3.0% 0.171 ** -13.97 11847 <.0001 
Percent of time NCP received SNAP benefits in prior year 8.5% 0.23 3.1% 0.14 ** -17.60 11892 <.0001 
NCP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.1% 0.036 0.1% 0.031   -0.52 8449 0.603 





Opted In to Full 
Service 
Mandatory Full 
Service         
All cases, demographics N=10,958 N=4,126         
  Mean Std Mean Std   t-value df prob 
Percent of time NCP enrolled in Medicaid in prior year 4.5% 0.165 2.5% 0.125 ** -7.81 9689 <.0001 
Custodial Parent, employment and benefit history                 
CP employed at case opening 61.7% 0.486 56.3% 0.496 ** -6.08 15082 <.0001 
Percent of time CP employed over prior 8 quarters 58.9% 0.419 54.1% 0.457 ** -5.88 6890 <.0001 
CP average quarterly earnings over prior 8 quarters $4,067 4756.7 $5,667 8798.2 ** 11.09 5060 <.0001 
CP experienced earnings dip of at least 20% within prior 8 
quarters 24.4% 0.430 14.3% 0.350 ** -14.89 9043 <.0001 
Time since first observed CP earnings (quarters) 26.4 15.28 24.6 17.48 ** -5.97 6633 <.0001 
CP earnings history sufficient to qualify for UI 57.9% 0.494 54.4% 0.498 ** -3.82 15082 0.000 
CP filed for unemployment within prior year 6.0% 0.2 3.5% 0.2 ** -6.59 9435 <.0001 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamps) benefits at case opening 23.0% 0.421 4.3% 0.204 ** -36.44 14214 <.0001 
Percent of time CP received SNAP benefits in prior year 20.3% 0.33 3.9% 0.16 ** -41.16 14363 <.0001 
CP receiving TANF benefits at case opening 0.1% 0.033 0.0% 0.000 ** -3.47 10957 0.001 
Percent of time CP received TANF benefits in prior year 1.2% 0.079 0.2% 0.026 ** -12.42 14915 <.0001 





Table B-16. Apparent Opt-Ins, Other ICSS Counties, Outcomes Comparison, Detailed 
  Opted In to Full Service Mandatory Full Service         
Outcome 
Adjusted 
mean sample size 
Adjusted 
mean sample size 
Difference 
Associated 
with Opt-In F-value prob 
Any FS child support collections made 36.5% 986947 1.1% 396350 35.4% ** 209455 <.0001 
Any RO child support collections made 3.6% 986947 25.1% 396350 -21.5% ** 164503 <.0001 
Any child support collections made, either type 40.0% 986947 26.2% 396350 13.8% ** 23838.3 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, either type, 
among those paying $527 394972 $783 103831 -$256 ** 8064.05 <.0001 
Total monthly child support collections, unconditional $211   $205           
Regular child support payment due, monthly $251 986947 $14 396350 $237 ** 227379 <.0001 
Arrears child support payment due, monthly $24 986947 $2 396350 $22 ** 35442.9 <.0001 
Money judgment made in child support case 0.4% 986947 0.0% 396350 0.4% ** 1612.66 <.0001 
Any arrears owed 44.5% 62173 2.9% 23876 41.6% ** 16051.7 <.0001 
Total arrears, among those who owe any $8643 27694 $9775 694 -$1132   3.74 0.0531 
Total arrears, unconditional $3850 62173 $284 23876 $3566 ** 2424.71 <.0001 
Total arrears owed to the state $190 62173 $23 23876 $167 ** 821.62 <.0001 
Total arrears owed to the CP $3660 62173 $261 23876 $3399 ** 2257.09 <.0001 
CP receiving SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits 23.4% 985761 5.0% 396346 18.4% ** 67429.2 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP (Food Stamp) benefits, CP, 
among those receiving benefits $409 230517 $358 19882 $51 ** 1082.68 <.0001 
Average monthly SNAP benefits, CP, unconditional $96   $18           
CP receiving TANF benefits 1.1% 985761 0.3% 396346 0.8% ** 2355.41 <.0001 
CP enrolled in Medicaid 17.5% 985761 3.8% 396346 13.7% ** 46904 <.0001 
CP employed 58.7% 321298 52.4% 129395 6.3% ** 1501.98 <.0001 
CP average quarterly earnings, among employed $8076 188498 $12131 67749 -$4055 ** 7136.33 <.0001 
NCP employed 52.0% 321361 47.3% 129374 4.7% ** 818.66 <.0001 
NCP average quarterly earnings, among employed $9444 167129 $17662 61195 -$8218 ** 2807.75 <.0001 
 
